8 things atheists don't want to hear

During my years of talking with theists, I have found a particular pattern of argumentation emerging. There is a number of claims that theists seem to routinely make when debating and atheist. In this post, I will list eight common theist arguments that I hear the most. As far as I can see (and I’m not just speaking for myself; I’ve witnessed hundreds of other atheists reply to these arguments), these eight arguments have no legs. If you want to ever sway an atheist (and potentially help him save his soul, if that’s what you believe), I suggest you stay away from these claims. Atheists just don’t want to hear them. And here’s why.

 

 

1.      If there’s no God, how come there exists a complex/organised/non-chaotic/organised/informatively meaningful Universe/human body?

 

In short, this is an appeal to the many different design arguments. We don’t need to dwell on any particular ones here. Atheists reject this reasoning because it is fallacious. Any claim that complexity/organisation/non-chaos requires an intelligent designer automatically excludes God as the answer to the question. If God exists, he also is complex/organised/non-chaotic. In fact, in order to comprehend (not to mention create) the entire Universe in every detail, God would have to be much more complex/organised/non-chaotic than the Universe itself. So, who created God? “God always existed” doesn’t help. Once you agree that a thing as complex as God can have always existed (without a cause), you simply can’t exclude (or even claim as less probable) that a non-intelligent and non-sentient (but still complex, organised and uncaused) entity may have always existed (or just existed uncaused) and given rise to the Universe as we know it. In fact, this is a less demanding explanation, as it requires us to make fewer assumptions about the entity.

 

Atheists see this glaring problem pretty much straight away. When confronted with the above type of argumentation, most of us simply smile and mutter something about intellectual dishonesty, fallacy, hypocrisy or special pleading.

 

The other obvious problem with this is that it constitutes Gap Theology. People have always made the mistake of creating gods to answer questions that their knowledge didn’t sufficiently explain. “I don’t know what caused the Universe/earthquake/plague” does not allow you to say “God caused it”. History has proven this, time and time again.

 

The argument is a failure, has been disproven time and time again, and is really quite embarrassing to make. If you want to convert an atheist (as opposed to confirming his position by showing the fallacy of your own position), I suggest you stay away from this one.

 

Note that I deliberately didn’t go into evolution, big bang cosmology or abiogenesis here. Scientists are working on the answers (and, as in case of evolution, often have them with unquestionable certainty) and God bless them for it. What we need to understand, though, is that we don’t need to know these things in order to throw away the design argument. God is simply not within any set of eligible options. Why? Because there’s no evidence that a god exists, such that would be capable of doing these things. You might as well say it was a magical stick or rock or giraffe.

 

 

2.      If God doesn’t exist, what’s the purpose of it all? Why are we here?

 

This is another example of a common theist fallacy. It actually amazes me how many (otherwise perfectly intelligent and rational) people fall for this one. The answer is simple: “if there’s no God then there’s probably no purpose. So what?”

 

Why is it so difficult for so many theists to comprehend that there doesn’t have to be a purpose? We are here because the Universe brought us here (see above) and we only have whatever goals or purposes we set for ourselves. Even if we had a wish that there were a purpose for our existence, that would just be wishful thinking.

 

Most atheists are mature enough to know that wishful thinking cannot alter reality (although, of course, it can affect our motivation and help us in changing reality ourselves, to the extent that we can; creation of gods isn’t one of the things we can do). It also doesn’t necessarily reflect reality. I can wish for whatever I like and my act of wishing it will not make it any more true than it were before I wished it.

 

 

3.      What happens after we die?

 

This is another example of wishful thinking. Atheists know that there’s no reliable evidence of that consciousness can survive physical death. There simply isn’t any evidence of an immortal (or any) soul. What happens after we die? We decompose. Our minds probably exist no more. As in the case above, this may not be very good news to some of us. And again, as in the case above, that’s no reason to invent an alternative reality; it’s wishful thinking.

 

Atheists do not buy into this argument at all. Most of them feel it’s silly; hopelessly irrational and completely misplaced. In addition, most of us don’t actually have a problem with the prospect of dying one day. While of course we do have our genetically-embedded survival instinct, we are fully aware of the fact that we’ll die one day and most of us can come to terms with this. We weren’t around for 13 billion years and that didn’t hurt, right?

 

 

 

4.      If there’s no God, why be good?

 

This is a typical moral blackmail argument. It’s also one that backfires on whoever makes it. The immediate thing that comes to mind is “so you only try to do the right thing because you think there’s a god out there? If you didn’t believe in God, you’d go raping, killing and stealing? What kind of human being does that make you?” Atheists don’t at all accept that you have to believe in a god (and a reward or punishment in the afterlife) in order to act morally. In fact, atheists KNOW this is not the case because they KNOW that, despite having no belief in a god (or his rewards or punishments) they certainly do have moral radars and do try to do the right thing. Why? That’s a different question altogether. Perhaps there are genetic factors in this (many animals do exhibit “moral” types of behaviour) and certainly there are cultural ones. But again, it doesn’t matter why. We know that our nature (including our cultural upbringing) is such that we tend to follow moral and ethical principles. We know that ethics is a field that’s actively being researched by devoted philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and many other professionals. We are keenly interested in learning about these developments. But we do not accept any claim that we must believe in a god in order to be moral human beings. We simply know, from our own experience, that this is not the case.

 

If you pose a question like this to an atheist, you are likely to annoy him/her. They will consider you ignorant, arrogant and morally deficient. The last thing they will do is want to hear whatever else you have to say.

 

 

5.      If there’s no God, there’s no objective morality, so it’s ok to kill babies as long as you think it’s ok to kill babies

 

This is related to the above point but is not the same. It’s also an example of moral blackmail. And again, it’s very risky for whoever makes the argument. If you think that the only reason it’s wrong to kill babies is that God says so (in practice, God often commands the killing of babies; see the Bible for the biblical version) then you don’t actually see anything wrong with killing babies per se. If God told you to kill a baby (or you thought God told you to kill a baby), you’d probably do it and feel very good about yourself. 9/11, witch hunts, Adolf Hitler (oh yes, he certainly was a believer; just read Mein Kampf) and the Inquisition come to mind.

 

Apart from being moral blackmail, the above argument is also another example of appealing to consequence (wishful thinking). There’s no real evidence that morality is objective at all. Most things that many of us would consider heinous are (or have been) practised readily and without any moral reservations in many cultures. Moral systems do have some common grounds (killing is generally – but by no means always – considered a wrong act) but we see a similar pattern in many other non-human animals. Any animal that lives in groups tends to have a “code of behaviour” in place. This is evident by empirical studies (many studies have been conducted confirming the claim that many animals have an “ethics-like” system in place, often including notions of apology, reward and punishment). But it also makes sense a priori (in simplest terms, “just by thinking about it”). If a group of animals has no rule in place, what’s the advantage of being part of the group? None.

 

We are also acutely aware that morality changes together with the times. This probably results from people discussing moral problems. Many of us can say we’ve been convinced to change our stance on many moral issues, simply as a result of observing human interactions or of discussing moral dilemmas with other people. The moral landscape of today appears to be a combination of everyone’s values.

 

Does that mean that it would be ok to kill babies if everyone believed that it was? Can a moral relativists (somebody who doesn’t believe in objective morality) say that it would? That depends on a number of things, including how we define our very basis of morality. The fact is, nobody amongst us seems to think that killing babies is ok. Most of us even feel a little sick when reading the biblical accounts of the Christian God slaughtering Egypt’s first-borns or of Moses (acting with God’s consent) commanding the Jews to wipe out all the Canaanites, including non-virgin girls (the virgins were to be kidnapped by the Jews “for themselves”) and babies.

 

Had we been brought up in a society where killing enemy babies were considered OK, would we think it was OK? Some of us might and some might not. Do we like that? Probably not. I certainly don’t feel very comfortable with that idea. But does that entitle me to conclude that objective morality exists? No, to do so would again be wishful thinking (appeal to consequence; a known fallacy).

 

 

 

6.      The Bible/Quran tells us there’s a god and the Bible/Quran is the true Word of God so it doesn’t lie.

 

To an atheist, the above is laughably back-to-front. Why are we to believe what a holy book says? In order to believe it, we would first have to accept that it was indeed the Word of God, or at least divinely inspired. Thus, we’d first have to believe that God exists.

 

There’s nothing about the Bible or the Quran that allows an objective observer to conclude that it is divinely inspired. To the contrary, both books have all the appearances of just another mythology. They are packed with stories of miracles, some more funny than others. They also contain moral propositions that most of us would find deplorable (stoning to death your own kid for being stubborn is one that comes to mind: Deuteronomy 21:18).

 

Some theists try to tell us that the Bible’s truth is proven by examples of fulfilled prophecies. I don’t have the room or the time here to go into specifics. But I will say that all of these prophecies are only “fulfilled” if we read them down in such a way as to retrospectively (ad hoc reasoning; another fallacy) make them true. An honest reading of any of these prophecies shows that they don’t actually come true; only little bits of them. In order to find these bits, we have to cherrypick and dismiss the bits that don’t check out. That’s not honest.

 

Muslims, on the other hand, try to rely on passages in the Quran that they claim are scientifically correct. “How could Mohammad know XY&Z when it wasn’t scientifically known in his day?” They then go on to describe some passages from the Quran. Again, they use a particular interpretation which (in an ad hoc manner) fits their preconceived (through scientific knowledge) views of the world. For instance, the Quran contains a comparison of earthly mountains to pegs. Many Muslims claim that this is miraculous because nobody in that day knew that mountains were in fact structured like pegs (being embedded in the ground). But is this honest? Mountains do look like pegs and it makes sense that a mythology could draw such a comparison. But this is where the comparison really ends. There are many things about mountains that are un-peg-like. For instance, their formation has nothing to do with the way a peg is placed into a ground.

 

No rational atheist will ever be swayed by claims of holy books. We know that these books exist and that they have existed in many other (non-Christian, Jewish or Muslim) mythologies. We also know that many mythologies do contain some elements of truth and we’d expect to see the same in the Bible or the Quran. We don’t accept cherrypicked claims of miracles or of inexplicable “scientific” knowledge; not the way they are proposed to us by our Muslim or Christian friends. These claims have all the markings of selective interpretation. Most atheists consider that to be dishonest and will dismiss it.

 

 

7.      There are eyewitness accounts!

 

This claim is very often made by Christians and refers to the Gospels. When hearing this claim, an atheist immediately becomes aware that they’re talking to an ignoramus. This is because we know that the gospels don’t even claim to be written by eyewitnesses. We also know that they’re not even signed. There’s nothing in the “Gospel according to John” that would indicate that it was written by a man named John (the “authorship” names were added later and didn’t appear originally).

 

There’s no merit in any claim that the Gospels were written by eyewitnesses. Most atheists know this (many of us are former believers, brought up in Christianity or Islam and very well versed – often better than practising believers – in the holy texts).

 

Now, even if the accounts did claim to be those of eyewitnesses (and they don’t), we know that there have been many other religions and cults that claimed to contain eyewitness accounts. We know that thousands of people claim to have been abducted by UFO’s and had experiments conducted on their bodies. There are thousands of people who claim to have seen Santa. There are also people who are convinced they are Elvis or, for that matter, Christ.

 

To top it up, there’s no independent contemporaneous evidence (non-Christian evidence) of even the existence of Jesus. This comes as real news to most Christians I speak to. And yet, it’s true. The earliest non-Christian mention of Jesus appears to be Josephus. But Josephus wasn’t born until sometime after Christ’s purported death. It certainly isn’t contemporaneous. There were historians around in Christ’s day and none of them appear to have taken any notice of the great works and miracles performed by the leader of the Christian sect.

 

Whether Jesus existed or not, atheists don’t accept the Gospels as historically accurate. Some of us (perhaps most) accept that Jesus, the man, did indeed exist and did probably lead a religious sect. Other than that, there’s very little that is really known about him. We see lots of hype in the four Gospels. And that’s what we’d expect to see in the accounts of any sect. At the same time, we see great inconsistencies between (and even within) the Gospels. Apologists sometimes try to explain these away by saying “if you have a car accident and four witnesses, you are bound to see four different versions”. That’s fine. But it’s also an admission that the book isn’t the inerrant Word of God. At the most, it’s human work, subject to the same flaws and errors as any other human work.

 

 

8.      God loves you

 

This one probably takes the cake. Why would an atheist ever budge to a claim that someone who (in his worldview) probably doesn’t exist loves him? What sort of emotionally insecure and desperate person would one have to be in order to be at all affected by this type of statement?

 

No, it’s a no-goer.

 

 

Jesus - a failed philosopher

One of the most well-known (if not the single most well-known) of Christ's sayings is what can be found in Luke 6:31. Christ is there attributed with saying "Do to others as you would have them do to you."

I've heard countless folks (theist and atheist alike) exclaim what a great philosophy that is, how revolutionary it is and how ahead of its time it is. Even Richard Dawkins has considered Jesus to be way ahead of his time philosophically and morally (see The God Delusion). The (false, of course) credit given to Jesus for bringing us The Golden Rule is what some Christians claim makes Christianity unique amongst the world's religions; "unlike them", Christianity is "all about love".

The above moral principle ("do unto others...") is often referred to as a variation of The Golden Rule. Note that Christ was by no means alone in proposing The Golden Rule. A quick search of the internet will show that versions of it appeared in many other cultures, some before Christ's day. Indeed, a negative version of it ("don't do to others what you don't want done to yourself") was uttered by Hillel the Elder. When challenged by a Gentile to explain the Torah while the Gentile is standing on one foot, Hilel said the following: "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and learn" (see Wiki). And this was before Christ's birth.

Whilst we don't know whether Christ's version (if he existed and uttered it at all) of the Golden Rule was in fact copied from Hillel the Elder (Christ, the man, may well have been a follower of some of the latter's school of thought), it is interesting that nobody seems to bother to even give half a thought to what the saying means. I admit I never thought about it myself, until recently reading Godless (a book written by Dan Barker, a former preacher of many years, turned atheist). It seems that, being brought up with it, we don't even stop and think about it.

So, what does it really mean? Well, it means what it says. You should treat others the way you yourself want to be treated. But does that make sense? What are the consequences or benefits of this rule? Would you really want me to do to you what I like having done to myself? Would you (or anyone who gives it half a thought) want someone's subjective preference to be the criterion by which he is to treat everyone around them? I, for one, happen to like to crack silly jokes. I like teasing people and I like being teased. It was early in my professional career that I found that I can't treat people the way I want to be treated. I can't be as direct and as open and forward with them as I like others being with myself. Barker gives an interesting (and much better, athough possibly only hypothetical) example himself. He proposes a husband and wife. The husband likes being hugged while the wife likes hugging (huggee/hugger scenario). If the husband is to listen to Christ's commandment, he would have to hug his wife because he wants to be hugged. This is despite the fact that he doesn't want to hug! His wife, in turn, would end up being hugged even though she prefers to be the hugger! We end up with two unhappy (though actually 100% compatible when it comes to hugging!) people by merely following Christ's rule.

If we're talking about loving one another (and this is what Christ is talking about in the relevant chapter), I suggest that a much more meaningful (and workable) expression of love is to do to others what they want you to do to them as opposed to what you would like them to do to you. That principle makes a hundredfold more sense than the subjective, self-centered caricature that Jesus allegedly came up with. It would mean that people's wishes would actually be respected as opposed to being contingent on the preferences of someone else; someone who gets to arbitrarily choose what it is that he should do to you only because he likes it done to himself!

It would seem that even as a purely human philosopher and moralist, Christ has failed to rise to a truly impressive standard. After all, it doesn't take a genius to see the obvious and glaring flaw in the philosophy. And this is a failure for a man. Now imagine a perfect and divine being making that blooper.

God as source of morality? Can't be.

If God doesn't exist then why is it wrong to commit murder?

If only I had a penny for each time I've heard this question from a theist. But let's just think about what this means.

Let's assume God exists and told us that murder is wrong. Does this mean that it's only wrong because God said that it's wrong? Or does it mean that it's wrong anyway and God (being omniscient) knows this and has told us this?

1. Murder is wrong only because God said so

If murder is only wrong because God said so then there's really nothing objectively wrong with murder itself. God said that it's wrong and therefore it's wrong. If God said that it was right, it would be right. This is why it was right for the Jews to commit genocide when God ordered it. That's fine. I can't argue with this as a hypothesis. Except, a theist who holds this view must agree that they have nothing against murder itself; they only condemn it because that's what God said. If God told them to kill (or perhaps to fly planes into buildings) then they would gladly do it. Murder would be right because God said so. In fact, if murder is only wrong because God says it's wrong then murder isn't wrong at all. It's only forbidden at this point in time by an arbitary dictator (God).

When making this argument, I've sometimes had people reply to me that God would NEVER say that murder is right because God is a loving God. But if that's the case then (the multiple Biblical occasions of God commanding murder and even genocide aside) God isn't really the one who decides what's right or wrong in the first place. Rather, murder is wrong because allowing murder wouldn't be a loving thing to do. The actual measure of right and wrong isn't based on God's decision at all; it's based on an objective standard of what is or is not loving. God, as an omniscient and benevolent entity, simply follows the rules. But God didn't make those rules. So, if this is the case then God is not the answer to the question of "why is murder wrong?".

Another objection I've encountered is this: "God is unchageable. God said murder is wrong and therefore God will NEVER say that murder is right". I consider this to be a copout. If God is the true source of morality then God may want to change it. We simply can't know what makes murder wrong. God is the only one who knows. Who are we to disagree? God can even change the terms of His "covenant" (speaking the Biblical God now) with us. Nobody can stop Him. Nobody can say "but God, you told us that last one was the final one". God is the boss, not you.

2. Murder is wrong objectively; God is omniscient and has TOLD us the objective truth that murder is wrong

As I have pretty much addressed in the second paragraph of point 1 above, this means that God is not the answer to the question of "why is murder wrong?" Murder is wrong despite God and it would be wrong even if God didn't exist. God didn't create moral standards, He merely repeats them to us. We might as well take God out of the loop and instead go to the source of moral standards (whatever it is) directly. God fails to answer the question.

Conclusion:

God can't be the answer to moral questions because if He were, we'd have to conclude that we are completely devoid of a moral radar and that murder isn't wrong after all. It's forbidden by a higher authority who could, at any time, turn around and tell us to slaughter each other and those who believe in Him would do exactly that. Is this an objective morality? I think not. Remember that the Nuremberg defence is not that genocide is morally right. Rather, it's "I was just obeying orders".

Why God is mathematically improbable

Let's start with a simple mind experiment. If you're an atheist, ask yourself now how many times you've heard a theist say "prove to me that there's no god". If you're a theist, ask yourself how many times you've asked an atheist this very question.

An atheist will often say "there's no evidence that there's no god and therefore I think He probably doesn't exist" or words to that effect. A theist, on the other hand, is likely to say "absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence" or something along those lines.

I intend to show here (using simple mathematics) that god is indeed very improbable. Atheists will be probably disappointed with the figures we arrive at at the end. Don't be. Keep in mind at all times that this argument is designed to show that, even if we extend deliberate generousity to theist assumptions, the existence of a god is nevertheless statistically improbable.

Let us begin.

Some terms:

By way of introduction, let's make it clear that we will here be discussing the truth of propositions. The central question is what weight can be given to a proposition that is not supported by any evidence and how this impacts on the probability of God's existence.

In our discussion, a proposition is any claim that relates to a question of fact (as opposed to a normative value - eg we shouldn't kill - or preference). Thus, an example of a proposition is "The Sun is green". Another example of a proposition would be "The Sun is not green".

The second term I need to introduce is "Unevidenced Proposition" (UP). An unevidenced proposition is simply a proposition for which there is no evidence and against which there is no evidence. We could think of it as a hypothesis. Note that I am deliberately steering away from terms that have some conventional scientific usage. We are not here concerned with science (science is all about data and repeatable experimentation; things that don't apply to God for our purposes).

　

1. Equalizing the scale

Let's take an Unevidenced Proposition (UP) and consider the following three statements about that proposition. Note that I am deliberately speaking in general terms here without actually proposing a specific UP. We are trying to agree on rules regarding UP's generally. So, we are speaking of just any hypothetical Unevidence Proposition.

a) UP is more likely than not to be true;

b) UP is more likely than not to be untrue;

c) UP is equally likely to be true as it is to be untrue.

Remember that there is no evidence in favour of UP and there's no evidence against it. In these circumstances, which of the above three statements is true? I am going to ask us to agree that only (c ) is true. Some atheists (ironically) might object at this point. Don't worry, trust your DJ. And remember, we are going out of our way to be generous.

There is, however, a problem with the above. Take two Unevidenced Propositions: Rabbits exist on Pluto and Green Rabbits exist on Pluto. Clearly, we can't say that the probability of both propositions being true is equal. The Green Rabbits proposition contains an additional requirement. The odds (very small, I'd think) that there are ANY rabbits on Pluto must be greater than the odds that some of those rabbits are green. There might indeed be some weirdly adapted rabbits on Pluto and none of them green.

I propose to introduced a sub-class of Unevidenced Proposition. In fact, two subclasses: Simple Unevidenced Proposition and Compound Unevidenced Proposition.

Thus, A Simple Unevidenced Proposition (SUP) is a proposition for which and against which there is no known evidence and which doesn't depend on (consist of) any other unevidenced propositions.

A Compound Unevidenced Proposition (CUP), in turn, is a proposition for which and against which no evidence exists and which contains in itself another unevidenced proposition.

In this way, "There are rabbits on Pluto" would be a Simple Unevidenced Proposition (SUP)and "There are green rabbits on Pluto" would be a Compound Unevidenced Proposition (CUP).

So, what can we conclude about a, b and c above? For our purposes, it will suffice to restrict it to SUP's. Thus, a simple unevidenced proposition is equally likely as unlikely to be true. Once again, I am fully aware that the scientist in you may not be liking this suggestion. But again, I ask you to be patient and remember that we are being generous here. We should also remember that we are going to discuss the existence of God; arguably not something that falls within science in any event. It's not observable. God by definition resides outside our realm (for our purposes He will, anyway) and we can't really say that our observations of things inside the Universe allow us to extrapolate conclusions about things outside the Universe. This is part of the reason for my generosity here.

　

2. Let's do some maths

Since we are going to make probabilistic calculations, we need to put the above into some maths. We have agreed that the odds that a SUP is true are equal to the odds that it's not true. This means that we can comfortably assign the probability of 50% to every SUP. Thus P(SUP)=50% or 0.5.

3. Let's define God

There are many ways to define God. As a simple minimum, let's go with "non-material, timeless, omnipotent, omniscient, sentient, uncaused entity that created the Universe".

4. God is a Compound Unevidenced Proposition

There are a number of disctinct attributes of God. Each of those attributes is (in principle) possible to be possessed by a non-God being. It's only when we put all of them together that we have a true god. For instance, there may be lots of non-material or omniscient entities. Each of those aspects of God is in fact a Simple Unevidenced Proposition in itself. There's no evidence that a non-material being exists. There's no evidence that it doesn't either. There may be many or there may be none. But what about a being who is BOTH non-material AND timeless? Well, this now becomes a CUP - a Compount Unevidenced Proposition. Each of the two attributes is Simple Unevidenced (there's no evidence that timless OR non-material beings exist) and, in combination with each other, they form a Compound Unevidenced Proposition.

5. Let's calculate God's odds - P(G)

a) the odds that a non-material entity exists must be 50%

b) what are then the odds that this entity is also a timeless entity (or that an entity who is both exists)? In order to calculate these odds, we use the "AND" probabilistic operator. Thus, P(A AND B)= P(A) * P(B)

Our odds that a non-material and timeless entity exists are therefore .5*.5=.25=25%

c) what are the odds that an entity exists who is non-material, timeless and omnipotent? Once again, this is an unevidenced proposition and once again it receives the same treatment. We end up with .25*0.5=0.125=12.5%

d) and omniscient? 0.125*0.5=0.0625

e) sentient 0.0625*0.5=0.03125

f) uncaused: the above * 0.5 = 0.015 or 1.5%

g) creator of Universe: 0.75%

Now, I may have missed some definitional elements of God that some of us might like to include. Perhaps there are some who might disagree with some of the ones that I did include. But that's not important. It will not change the result overly dramatically. What is important is that, BASED ON the "no evidence for or against entitles us to equal odds" principle (which in itself is of course pure generosity towards theism!), the odds that God exists are only 0.75%.

And this confirms intuitively. There are huge numbers of hypothetical entities (probably infinite!) that we could in principle conceive of. Assuming a finite reality, only a finite number of them actually exist. Hence, the odds of correctly guessing out (without evidence) that a particular creature with particular attributes exists must be very low indeed.

Atheists know this. This is why they feel a little weird when a theist demands evidence that there's no god. To us, lack of evidence that a god does exist is a very prudent reason to start with the working assumption that no god exists indeed.

Comments are welcome

@allocutus

　

Ontological Argument Against God

Most or us are no doubt familiar with St Anselm's Ontological Argument for God's existence. For those who are not, it can be found here:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Anselm

Having thought about it a bit, I have realised that St Anselm doesn't give God enough credit. He limits God's greatness to "that which can be conceived of". But really, God must be greater than that. So here goes:


1. God is, in principle, such great a being that no greater being can exist

2. A being that is so great that we can't conceive of it is greater than a being that we can conceive of (our minds are limited in their ability to conceive)

3. Therefore God must, in principle, be a being that we can't conceive of

4. But we have conceived of God in 1&3 above

5. Therefore God doesn't exist



On a bright side, not all hope is lost. If we all stop believing (well, those who do) and stop conceiving of God, we might give rise to His existence. Just like Saint Anselm brings Him into the real world by simply imagining Him**. Shall we try?

**Who made that guy a saint? What were they thinking?

Complex Universe Disproves God

The complex Universe as evidence against God

In this post, I will seek to illustrate that the existence of the complex Universe is very powerful evidence against the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. Indeed, the same goes for any other claimed deity who possesses the characteristic of being the Universe's creator.


Assumption: The Universe must have had a cause

In order to consider this issue, we will proceed from the above assumption. That is, we assume that the Universe did not cause itself and did not spontaneously generate with no cause.


Equal or greater complexity of cause

In order for A to cause B (with no other factors at play; no other sources of information), A must be at least as complex as B.

By complexity, I don’t mean structural complexity. Rather, I’m referring to informational complexity.

Imagine an entity P (I will later also refer to it as P1) that causes the Universe. For our purposes, suppose that P is a non-sentient entity; it’s a “thing” that causes the Universe. P causes the Universe by transforming itself into it; in other words it somehow turns into the singularity and then explodes.

We must keep in mind that P is not governed by the physical laws as we know them. That’s because these laws are part of our Universe. P, having existed “prior” to the singularity, is not part of this Universe and therefore there are no grounds to assume that it’s governed by the same physical laws. Note that I don’t anticipate any objections at this point, at least not from theists. Theists posit the existence of a god who is not subject to the physical laws of the Universe. Equally, P is not. In fact, P creates these laws (by generating the Universe).

We don’t know what the structure of P is. But we do know that it’s capable of generating the Universe and that the Universe it will generate will necessarily expand into what we have today, with all its laws and the (very improbable, it is said) set of physical constants.

Hence, whatever the structure of P is (and it might indeed be physically a simple structure, though one might argue that it could not be; but that’s not relevant), P must contain all the information needed to generate something as complex as this Universe. Sure, it doesn’t have to have a map of where Andromeda will be at any specific time, or even that Andromeda will exist. But the precise position of objects in our Universe is not why we call it “complex”. A completely random, chaotic universe can be imagined which nevertheless has lots of objects flying chaotically and randomly with no set laws or constants (eg where each object runs by its own random laws).

And yet, in the sense in which the Universe's complexity (and, ultimately, its unlikelihood) is proposed, such a random chaotic universe would not be considered as complex and improbable as our existing Universe. And if it would, then we have to agree that there's nothing specifically improbable and complex about our Universe in the first place. This would potentially defeat the my argument. But it would also amount to a conclusion that the existence and nature of the Universe (as it is) cannot be used as evidence for the existence of a god; there being nothing particularly unlikely about the Universe's laws and constants.

All that said, it is traditionally claimed that the complexity of the Universe rests in the existence and nature of those laws and those constants. It is in this context and to this extent that P must contain all the complexity of the Universe.

In other words, P must be just as “informationally organised” as the Universe itself.


Improbability

It is often argued (and theists often rely on this) that the Universe, with its specific set of constants and laws is very improbable indeed. People have proposed numbers to represent this improbability and these numbers are nothing short of mindboggling.

There are many arguments against this proposition. Some claim that these constants are a result of a single property of the Universe (making it much less improbable), others take issue with the significance of the improbability for debates about the existence of a god and so forth. We are not interested in any of that in this discussion. We assume that the Universe, with its set of laws and constants, is indeed very, very improbable.

Now, let’s get back to our hypothetical entity, P. P is the entity that existed (in this scenario) “prior” to the singularity and its only property was that it would necessarily (via laws we don’t know or understand; laws contained in P itself) turn itself into the singularity which then would explode and give rise to the Universe as we know it.

My argument is that P must be at least as improbable as the singularity and as the Universe itself. This should be very simple to grasp and should not meet any reasonable objection. Why? Because for all practical purposes we might as well (we won’t, but I’m trying to illustrate something) say that P is the Universe in its earlier stage. Remember, P does nothing except for turning itself into the Universe as we know it. We could say it’s the Universe in an embryonic stage. P already contains all the data (in some structural form that we don’t and can’t know) for the generation of the Universe.

Since P contains information about every single of the Universal constants and every single of the Universal laws, it is in effect a “packed up” version of the Universe; an embryo. And because it contains al the information that is needed to give rise to this precise Universe (and no other!) it must be equally improbable as the Universe itself. After P transforms into the Universe as we know it, no further information is added. The complexity of information is equal between P and the Universe. No changes in informational complexity. Hence, the improbability must be equal (or even greater for P, but I don’t want to go that far; there’s no need).

To sum up, we have now the following scenario:

1. An entity P exists which then turns itself into the Universe as we know it. It has no capacity to do anything else except to transform into the Universe.

2. P is at least as improbable as the Universe itself.

Let’s now vary P a little.


P2 and U2

Now that we have this construct of P, let’s go a step further. Imagine a different version of P. We’ll call it P2.

P2 is exactly the same as P but it is a little bit more complex. P2 contains the information needed for generation of two alternative universes. One of those is our Universe (call it “U” or “U1”), with all of its complex constants and improbable laws. The other is an alternative universe (call it “U2”), with a different set of constants and different laws. Note that the constants and the laws of U2 are just as improbable (at least approximately so, depending on how many constants there are of course) as those of U. This is not particularly relevant but it is an interesting point to add.

We can play around and assume that U2 is a universe that’s tuned in to only do two things: Big Bangs and Big Crunches. If it gets generated, it will pulsate like that to forward infinity (forever and ever from the point of generation).

It’s not known whether P2 will give rise to U (our universe) or to U2 (the pulsating universe). The decision will be random and the randomiser is based on some property within P2 itself.


P2 is more improbable than P

Having introduced P2, I can now claim that P2 is more improbable than P. That’s because in addition to being able to generate U, it can also (but alternatively) generate U2. On top of this it contains an additional property; the randomiser.

Because P2 contains more information than P1, P2 is more improbable than P1. It’s more complex and more organised. Keep in mind, that it’s the Universe’s complexity and organisation that we claimed makes it so improbable in the first place.


Enter P3 – P2 with a twist

Now, imagine another P. We will call it P3. P3 has the same characteristics as P2 except that it is conscious and intelligent. It can actually think. Its thinking ability is very limited, however. The only thing that P3 can think about is whether to generate U1 or U2. In other words, the decision about which universe to generate is not random; it’s an intelligent decision.


P3 is more improbable than P2

It shouldn’t take more than a primary school diploma to quickly see that P3 must be more improbable than P2. That’s because in addition to the characteristics of P2, it has a third characteristic; intelligence.


A quick side-point about intelligence

We know that intelligence is a very rare thing. We also know how complex it is. There are many claims that the human brain is in fact more complex than the entire rest of the Universe. I don’t know if that refers to structural complexity or processing complexity (the ability to process information in this case) but that’s not important. What is important is that intelligence is an extremely complex and rare thing. If we agree on this, then the difference in improbability between P2 and P3 must be enormous indeed.


But a side-point it was; non-essential to the argument

The above paragraph should very quickly and very intuitively make it clear that P3 must be many times over more improbable than P2. But even without that, the very fact that P3 has this one additional characteristic makes it more improbable than P2.

We can safely conclude that P3 is at least a little bit (though one might say “a whole lot”) more improbable than P2.


Enter P 4

Now let’s imagine an entity P4. This entity is just like P3 except it’s not limited to generating only U1 or U2. P4 can generate any of an infinite (or at least a very very very large number) of potential universes.

Just as P3, P4 can intelligently decide which of these universes to generate. But unlike P3, P4 possesses the information for the generation of a huge multitude of universes, together with their sets of laws and constants. P4 is much more complex than P3.

Since P4 contains much more information than P3, P4 is more improbable than P3. It has at its disposal the complex structures of an almost infinite number of plausible universes (perhaps the number is in fact infinite).


Enter P5

P5 is our final entity. It is just like P4 but with an extra twist. P5 is unlimited in its ability. It can generate an infinite number of things, not just universes. There are no limits for P5. For our purposes, we can say that P5 is omnipotent.

In addition, P5 differs from the other P's in that it doesn't transform itself into the Universe; rather it creates it and then continues with its own, independent existence.


P5 is a great deal more improbable than P4, P3, P2, P1 or U1

Given that P5 has infinitely more characteristics and abilities than each of the other P’s, it is clear that P5 must be more improbable than all the other P’s.

And of course, since P2, P3 and P4 are more improbable than the Universe itself, P5 must be greatly more improbable than U1.


P5 is not God

No, P5 is not God. P5 only has some characteristics of God, at least insofar as the Judeo-Christian variety is concerned. The latter has many more characteristics; capacity to love, ability to make moral judgment etc etc etc.

But for our purposes, P5 has the minimum necessary ingredient of God; creational omnipotence.


Conclusion

I have just demonstrated that an entity with creational omnipotence is greatly (one might say infinitely) more improbable than the Universe itself.

What follows is that, even without the additional traits of love and morality etc, the concept of an intelligent and omnipotent entity that created the Universe (aka God) is a great deal more improbable than the Universe itself.

And it certainly is also a great deal (also possibly infinitely) more improbable than P1.

To sum up:

1. The Universe has a cause
2. That cause could be P1; a non-intelligent entity that just gives rise to the Universe and can’t do anything more
3. That cause could also be an intelligent, omnipotent entity, often referred to as God
4. God is a great deal (maybe even infinitely) more improbable than P1
5. Therefore, it is very, very unlikely that the Universe was created by a God
6. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is by definition the creator of the Universe (I will not be supporting this; this is obvious)
7. Therefore, combining 5 and 6, its is very, very unlikely that the Judeo-Christian God, as defined, exists.


Obvious objection followup

“Ah, Allo. But you’ve explained nothing. Just how does this P1 come into existence itself?”

I can just see this coming up in post 2.

The answers is: I don’t know. Just like you don’t know how God comes into existence. Saying “God is beyond time” doesn’t help. P1 is also beyond time as we know it, as is any entity that exists outside the Universe (time is part of the Universe). Saying “God is supernatural” doesn’t help. We might just as well call “P1” supernatural in the very same sense.

God could have spontaneously generated. Or always existed. Or created Himself. You can pick and choose. It makes no difference. Why? Because P1 could also have always existed. Or created itself. Or spontaneously generated.

Whilst this doesn’t answer the ultimate question of “where did the Universe come from”, this is not what this argument has sought to do. Wherever the Universe came from, it is very, very, very unlikely that it was created by an intelligent, omnipotent god. An almost infinitely more likely cause (and we did assume that a cause is needed) is the simple (in comparison, of course) P1.

P1; an entity whose origin we can’t explain any better (or worse) than God’s but which nevertheless is equally capable of generating the Universe and which is enormously (infinitely?) less unlikely than the Judeo-Christian deity.

God - the deadbeat who couldn't create a universe

If God is omniscient and uncaused then the design of the Universe is uncaused and God is no answer to the problem of the Universe's design.

There's something that has been bothering me for a while about people's beliefs in God the Creator.

Clearly, the single most common argument that theists use when defending their claim that a god exists is any of a series of cosmological arguments. This is fine, as long as getting us from existence of the Universe to existence of a First Cause goes (subject to some difficulties with disproving infinite regression). It's the next step that brings on difficulties; the claim that the First Cause must be intelligent and sentient. There have been many attempts, each meeting with its string of rebuttals. What I wanted to raise here is the "complexity/fine-tuning" claim.

Essentially all these complexity/fine-tuning claims (William Lane Craig's ridiculous "a mind or an abstract number did it" fallacy aside) rely on some aspects of the Universe that appear to be designed in a complex manner, all the way down to the "very, very improbable" set of universal constants, "designed to give rise to life (or sometimes it's said to be *intelligent life*) and/or to sustain it".

There are many problems with this argument. For instance, the argument is circular, it's anthropocentric, it appeals to special pleading and it proposes an entity that is necessarily more complex and fine-tuned than the Universe itself. But that's not what bothers me in this case. Rather, my problem here is Omniscience. It seems to me that an omniscient god is a useless deadbeat who can't have designed the Universe. Here's why.

Short syllogism:

A. God in all states of affairs knows everything about all states affairs (omniscience).

B. God in all states of affairs knows everything about Himself in all states of affairs (omniscience).

C. God is uncaused (axiomatic).

D. Since God in all states of affairs possess all knowledge and God is uncaused, God's knowledge is uncaused (A-C).

E. Any ideas, plans or designs that are derived from God are uncaused (from D).

F. If the design of the Universe is derived from God then the design of the Universe is uncaused (From E).

G. From F, if the design of the Universe is derived from God then God's intelligence or sentience is irrelevant to the generation of the Universe's design.

H. Hence, for the purposes of the existence of a complex/fine-tuned Universe, God's sentience or intelligence are redundant (from G).

I. (OPTIONAL) Therefore, God is a deadbeat conveyer of uncaused ideas.




Long version follows.



What is Omniscience?

Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omniscient) defines the term (or its derivative pronoun in this case) as follows:
1
: having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight
2
: possessed of universal or complete knowledge


What about theists? What, to them, is omniscience?

While the dictionary definition is clear enough, what should matter more here is what omniscience means in theology. Let's start with the Bible. What are God's claimed attributes when it comes to the issue of knowledge? Here are some examples.

a) No thought can be withholden from thee. (Job 42:2)
b) For He knoweth the secrets of the heart (Psalm 44:21)
c) For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things.
(1 John 3:20)


The Catholic Encyclopedia (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06612a.htm ) says the following about God's omniscience:
"That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things, follows from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows them individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad as well as what is good."

 

"That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things, follows from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows them individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad as well as what is good."

It is clear from the above that the Biblical God has definitionally perfect knowledge in that God knows absolutely everything. This is consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church, the largest Christian organisation in the world.

God's knoweldge is perfect. God "knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately". This must mean that God knows at all times all the decisions he's ever made and all the decisions he ever will make. One might here argue that God is "timeless" and therefore the term "will make" is not applicable to God. That's fine but it makes no difference to my argument. Whatever being "timeless" means, the fact of the matter is that God in all states of affairs knows everything about all states of affairs.


If God is omniscient, God can't design the Universe

Since God possesses all knowledge of all things (including Himself) in all states of affairs, this means that God must in all states of affairs know all the decisions He will make, makes or has made in all states of affairs. God possesses complete and uncaused knowledge. This knowledge includes a complete and uncaused knowledge about how the Universe is to be created (or is created or was created) and what properties the Universe is to possess (or possesses or has possessed). Indeed, the entire design of the Universe (along with whatever process God used to design it) is uncaused. It exists in the mind of god without a cause.

When I say 'without a cause' I'm actually including God Himself. God did not (could not) cause the plan of the Universe's design. That's because this plan is part of God's knowledge and God's knowledge by its very nature includes knowledge of all things. God has at all points in all states of affairs known what that design is. There is not and has never been and will never be such a state of affairs where God exists but does not possess the complete knowledge of the Universe's design. A human analogy would be a man who is born with the knowledge of how to design the world's most sophisticated aircraft. Every detail of this design was present in the man's mind since he was born. Clearly, then, the man did not need to even think about the design. He did not have to change its plan from any state to any other state. The plan was complete ever since the man was born and the man's intelligence (in terms of reasoning) did not contribute at all to this design.

But here's the problem: if the design itself exists uncaused (in all states of affairs in the memory bank of God) then the existence of a sentient and intelligent entity does not explain the existence of the design. God's intelligence (or sentience) had no contribution to the existence of the design. Therefore, they are redundant as attributes of God the Creator.

What this means is that, on the most common theist understanding of God's nature (omniscient), God fails to answer the question of the Universe's complexity or its apparent fine-tuning to sustain life. If God is omniscient then God's intelligence and sentience are redundant to the creation of the Universe's design. God is as good an explanation as any First Cause who uncausedly has in it the entire plan of the entire Universe which (just as good as random) just happens to uncausedly exist within the nature of the First Cause.


Occam's Razor and the alternative

A more economically effiicient solution (let's have a shave with Occam) would therefore be a First Cause in whose nature it uncausedly is to create the Universe (with the very same properties) and to do nothing else and who is neither intelligent nor sentient. Yes, of course, we don't know anything about what type of First Cause this might be. But that's ok because we have no idea what type of First Cause a god is either.


Conclusion

An omniscient God is no explanation of the Universe's design. If God is omniscient then the Universe's design is uncaused and God is an intellectual deadbeat.

William Lane Craig Cosmological Fallacy

In his debate with Hitchens, Craig presents three arguments for the existence of God. In this post, I will deal with the first argument; the Cosmological Argument. This is written in response to a twitter user named @kipkenyan.

Note that I'm not addressing any arguments made by Hitchens, nor any replies by Craig. I'm simply attacking his opening argument.


A) Craig's Strawman

Craig opens up with the question of "why anything at all exists". He claims this question is the most profound question in philosophy. He then commits a fashionable Strawman by asserting that "typically atheists have answered this question by saying the Universe is eternal and uncaused". This is of course untrue. Atheists don't typically claim to know where the Universe came from or what caused it. They simply reject the position that it was caused by a god. Many atheists don't even bother with this question at all. They simply go about their lives without believing that there is a god. Those who do ponder the question often leave it for the scientists to answer. And so it should be. The sheer fact that I don't believe in a god doesn't qualify me in the field of physics or cosmology. I'm therefore in no position, and under no obligation, to answer such questions. Curiously, if theist arguments are anything to go by, theists think that believing in a god magically makes them qualified in the above fields. While this little Strawman of Craig's raises an interesting point about his integrity (or his knowledge about what atheism actually is), I will not spend any more time on that. It's not particularly relevant to Craig's Cosmological argument itself.


B) The question REMAINS unanswered

The second interesting point to make is that the question of "why is there anything rather than nothing" cannot possibly be answered with "god". The reason is that "god" is PART OF "everything". In other words, when we ask "why is there anything rather than nothing?", that question (if it's to mean anything) must refer to the entire set of things that exist (SOTTE from now on - see note 1 below) - everything that exists. If a god and a single universe exist, the question is "why is there a god and universe as opposed to there being no god and no universe?". If a god and a number (say, X) of universes exist, the question is "why is there a god and X universes as opposed to nothing?". If no god exists and the universe is uncaused, the question is "why is there a universe rather than nothing?". If no god exists and the universe is caused by a single cause (which, like the hypothetical god, is uncaused) then the question would be "why is there a universe and a single uncaused cause?". I could go on longer with more conceivable permutations but I think the point has been made. "God" doesn't answer the question of why there's anything as opposed to nothing. God is simply a bandaid to relieve immediate bleeding.

So, if I were to ask a theist "why is there a universe plus god as opposed to no universe and no god?", I'd likely get the following answer:

"The universe exists because God has created it and God Himself is uncaused".

That's very nice but it necessarily entails some serious special pleading. If the theist is willing to concede that an uncaused entity (in this case God) can exist, how can the theist exclude that the Universe itself (in this case when I say "Universe" I mean the Singularity) was uncaused or (if the Singularity itself does have a cause) that the Universe (again, in the broader sense that includes the Singularity) had a non-god cause that itself was uncaused?

I have asked theists this question before and have received answers along the following lines:

"God can exists uncaused because that's what God is by definition. Nothing else can".

The above is, of course, a copout. It's dishonest. It's special pleading. We DON'T KNOW what attributes God has because there's no evidence that a god exists in the first place. Theists have invented a god (without any evidence) to fill this precise gap.

But why did they give this entity the attributes of intelligence and sentience? There are a number of answers to this question. These include the "complex (fine-tuned) nature of the Universe" and the existence of intelligent life in it. Each of those arguments is easily refutable. However, since Craig does not rely on either of them in his opening statement of the Hitch debate, I don't intend to argue them at this juncture.

The only point I wish to make at this time is that God is not an answer to the question of "why there is something rather than nothing".

Note 1: I originally used the term "Cosmos" to denote "everything that exist, including a god if one exists". It was not the appropriate word, as @scotsmanmatt has pointed out. He's correct to the extent that theologians define "cosmos" to exclude the Creator but include the Universe. That said, as long as I made my meaning clear (which I surely did), there ought to be no dispute about it. It's the concept that matters on not the tag you give it. Evidently, @scotsmanmatt couldn't find anything of substance to pick on.



C) Craig's argument itself goes as follows:

1. The Universe is not eternal. It had a beginning 13.7 billion years ago, when it started from a Singularity.

My comment:

Yes, it's certainly true that the Unvierse AS WE KNOW IT began in a Big Bang, some 13.7 billion years ago. Of course, we don't know what (if anything) caused it. It's the proponent who must prove that the Universe was caused by god.


2. An atheist who accepts the Big Bang would have to believe that the Universe came from nothing and by nothing (Craig's words).

My comment:

No, that's not true. We simply don't know what the Universe came form and "by what". Indeed, it's the theists who suggest that the Universe came from nothing. They posit that God created matter and energy OUT OF NOTHING. Atheists generally don't take a firm view on this question. Scientists believe that the Singularity contained (in very small space, some would say infinitely small) all the matter and energy that exists today (possibly even more as some scientists posit that 90+% of initial matter and energy cancelled each other out and what remains is but a small fraction). We don't know what (if anything) caused the singularity itself. There are a number of hypotheses advanced by a number of scientists. It may well be that we'll never be able to find out.

The bottom line is that atheists don't at all claim that the Universe came from nothing. Most simply say that they don't know what (if anything) caused the Singularity. This demonstrates yet another Strawman by Mr Craig.

Not only is it a Strawman; it's also comical. Craig claims that nothing can come from nothing and yet he himself proposes a god who creates matter and energy from...you guessed it...NOTHING. What does that explain? Yes, you guessed it again, NOTHING. But more on this a little later.


3. Since it doesn't make sense that the Universe came from nothing, there must be a cause that brought the Universe into being.

My comment:

Let's grant Craig this, for the sake of the argument. Let's agree that there must have been a cause that brought the Universe into being.


4. The cause (let's call it FC from now on; First Cause) must have been a timeless, spaceless, immaterial being of unphathomable power.

My comment:

a) The FC was timeless

Craig doesn't define this word. Just what does "timeless" mean? What is time? Essentially, time is the rate at which things happen. In order for time to exist, there must be different states of affairs connected causally. For instance, take cold water. The water is in a pot and heat is acting upon it. The water becomes boiling water. Its energy properties have changed. One state of affairs has changed into another state of affairs. This change denotes that there must be TIME. Time is the measure of the rate at which this process has taken place. Whenever things happen, there is some type of time.

Another example would be a thought process. Imagine a mind that makes a decision, for instance a decision to create a universe. There must be a state of affairs where the mind exists but there is no decision to create a universe. There must also be an action in the mind (a thought) that results in the decision to make a universe. Then there must be a state of affairs in which there exists a (made by this mind) decision to create a universe. A being who makes this decision cannot be a timeless being because there have been at least two different states of affairs involving that being. There has been a change. There must have been some type of time. The alternative would mean that the decision existed while not existing and this of course is a logical contradiction.

How then could FC be timeless? There seem to be only two possible ways:

i) the being did not engage in any cause-effect activity at all until its decision (or action) of creating the Universe. This means that the being could not think, plan, or even exist in any meaningful way. Such a being would be DORMANT, HIBERNATING. It would have to "wake up" without a cause and then decide to create the Universe.

But a being who creates the Universe WITHOUT A CAUSE (such as a thought process, decision-making etc) is not a being that needs to be sentient or intelligent. It's as good as a random generation of the Universe.

What about a being who "wakes up" from eternal (or "timeless") hibernation to start a process of thinking which results in a decision to create? Does that alleviate the above problem? No. For all intents and purposes, the being was without existence (functionless) until it "woke up". It woke up with a full set of faculties to engage in the process of creation. If such a being can wake up spontaneously, why can't the Universe (or some non-sentient precursor of it) come into existence spontaneously? Of course it can. To say otherwise would be to engage in special pleading.

But that's not the only problem here. Perhaps a bigger problem is that a being who was hybernating and woke up to engage in a thought process is no longer a timeless being for our purposes. Commencing with the state of affairs in which it wakes up and moving on to all other states of affairs causally flowing from that state of affairs, the entity is subject to some type of time. We have a change between states of affairs and that change moves in one direction only.

Thus, a timeless creator is a creator who has idled away (without even knowing of its own existence; awareness requires thought and that's a process which gives rise to causative time) and uncausedly sprung into action. Such a creator is no better an explanation than a random, uncaused generation of the Universe (or a of a non-sentient cause of it) in the first place. In fact, the latter is more economical as it doesn't require intelligence and sentience. Occam kills God.

ii) Logical contradiction. The second conceivable way in which FC could be timeless is via a logical contradiction. Thus, we'd be saying that logic doesn't bind the entity in question (indeed, theists sometimes do posit that God isn't limited by logic). In this way, we could say that the decision to make the Universe existed simultaneously with it not-existing. Note that I'm not particularly interested in arguing about whether logic is truly universal (and applies to god) or not. The point is moot. Why? Because if the laws of logic did not apply to FC then there's no basis to say anything about the FC. The FC could create the Universe while not creating the Universe. Indeed, FC could exist while not existing. To go further, if the laws of logic don't apply outside the Universe then there's no requirement that the Universe have a cause at all. By abandoning logic, we abandon any and all ability to say anything meaningful about the First Cause (including "it exists").

The conclusion here is that a timeless FC is either one that would be no better an explanation than a random creation of the Universe OR one that would have to defy logic and thereby obliterate any ability for discourse.

b) Spaceless

My comment:

I don't take issue with Craig's claim that the FC must have been spaceless. Assuming that no space at all exists outside our Universe, that assertion is true. In any event, let's grant it to Craig.

c). Non-material

Craig claims that the Cause of the Universe must have been immaterial. This is, of course, because the Universe is said to contain all matter and energy that exists.

My comment:

While it is true that (given the assumption above) the Cause of the Universe must have been immaterial (in the "non-material" sense; the choice of words was Crag's, not mine!), it also must have been something that is capable of INTERACTING with matter, right down to the point of creating the same (either from nothing or from some other pre-existing "substance").

What kinds of things are there that are immaterial but are capable of interacting with matter, to the point of creating the same ex nihilo? For my part, I don't know. I have no idea. Us humans have never experienced energy-matter (we know now that the two are interchangeable and I'll use the two words interchangeably) being created out of nothing and we are in no position to comment what type of entity could achieve such a task.

What entity does Craig propose? He proposes a mind! Now, I wonder what minds Craig has been dealing with. Clearly they can't be the same types of minds that are known to humanity. We don't know of any minds that can at all interact (without being in control of a physical body, that is) with energy-matter, let alone create the same out of nothing!

"Ah-huh", I can hear a retort, "but this is a special kind of mind. One of its kind. It's GOD'S mind".

Let's remember this when we get to the gist of my attack of Craig's argument (yes, the gist is coming soon)

d) Of unfathomable power

My comment:

Well yes, in the sense that the Cause is capable of creating an entire universe, its power (power to react with or create matter) is truly unfathomable, at least given our current knowledge of the world.


D) Craig's conclusion

What does Craig conclude from the above? Here it comes:

"There are only two kinds of things that meet this description: either an abstract object like numbers or a personal mind. Abstract objects can't do anything. That leaves a mind. A personal creator."

This is it folks! This is Craig's cosmological argument. But hang on a minute! This can't be right! Just how does a mind meet "this description"?

[1] Timeless mind?

Is a mind timeless? No, not any minds that we have ever heard of.

Indeed, the only minds we know of happen to process information by thinking about it. One thought leads to the next in a long series of thoughts. This is activity and it's a cause-effect process and it denotes time. No mind that we know of can be timeless. In fact, if a mind were timeless, it would have to be dormant and therefore would be incapable of doing the one thing that minds do: thinking.

[2] Immaterial mind?

Can a mind be immaterial? Again, we don't know of any minds that can exist without a body. Despite the large numbers of claims about ghosts, there is not a single confirmed sighting, let alone any empirical evidence of a ghost having a sentient and intelligent mind (as opposed to being a semi-transparent apparition of sorts). Intelligent and sentient minds are something that we know of as a product of a physical brain. Despite many attempts, there has never been any study that would successfully demonstrate that dualism is true.

[3] Spaceless mind?

What about "spaceless"? Are minds spaceless? Now, that might be true, in the sense that the mind is the PROCESS of thought, knowledge and experience. The mind itself is not the material body (brain) that it is based in. But can a mind exist in a spaceless state of affairs? Again, not if we mean any type of minds that we have had an opportunity to deal with or observe.

[4] Mind of unfathomable power?

What about minds who have unfathomable power? Remember, in this context, "unfathomable power" must mean that the entity in question is capable of creating an entire Universe. The "power" in this context is not referring to "processing power" (aka intelligence). Why not? Because there's nothing in Craig's argument that demands that the First Cause have intelligence in the first place. Craig is not running a "fine-tuning" argument here. But even if he were, this wouldn't help him, for reasons that I will not go into here (but will touch upon it further down).


E) Craig's conclusion FAILS.

So, Craig has given us a list of things that he claims meet the criteria required by the First Cause. The list is populated by two things: abstract concepts such as numbers and a personal mind. I'm not going to address abstract concepts at any length. Let's stick to minds. Of the four attributes (timeless, immaterial, spaceless, of unfathomable power) of the FC, minds (as we know them) possess precisely zero.

Not only do none of the attributes of the FC outlined by Craig exist in a mind, but the FC lacks (on Craig's argument) the only attributes that do define a mind. A timeless or immaterial or spaceless or very powerful mind could exist in principle. But it won't be a mind unless it is sentient (at least) and intelligent (preferably, one might think). But none of these attributes are necessary for the FC to possess, on Craig's argument.

Thus, both of the following are true:

- The argued First Cause's necessary attributes lack all attributes of minds;

AND

- The mind's known attributes lack all argued attributes of the First Cause.

What follows is that there's no basis whatsoever to claim that the First Cause was a mind (aka Personal Creator).


F) Some special pleading

Of course, one can argue that the Mind in question is unlike all known minds. It transcends the limitations that minds within the Universe are subject to. It's truly special. It therefore IS timeless, spaceless, immaterial and capable of creating matter out of thin nothing.

The problem here is that, since we're willing to conjure up a mind that has nothing in common with what we mean by "mind", one that doesn't need to have intelligence or sentience and one that has four un-mind-like attributes, we are engaging in special pleading that is nothing short of monumental.

What's then to stop us from doing special pleading in the other direction? Why can't we just posit a special, non-intelligent non-sentient FC? Something like the claimed god but which lacks intelligence and sentience. It has the "physical" ability to create the Universe. It's timeless and therefore the action of creating the Universe is random and uncaused (just as the claimed God's "waking up" would have to be). Indeed, such a solution would be more economical than the claimed God. It would not have to possess two redundant attributes; intelligence and sentience.

A further problem with this special pleading is that it involves double-standards in the application of empirical knowledge. On the one hand, Craig attempts to invoke "the mind" on the basis of the types of entities that we know of (otherwise, he wouldn't be claiming that there are only two options; mind and abstract numbers; instead he would simply agree with us atheists in saying that we don't know what caused the Big Bang, if anything). On the other hand, he attempts to resolve the problem by invoking a thing that we don't know of; a mind that doesn't need any of the usual characteristics of a mind and that has four characteristics not possessed by any known mind. He might as well say "I propose a weird invisible flying giraffe who likes to dance Can-Can".


G) Fine-tuning objections

While Craig did not argue fine-tuning (or the complexity of the Universe) in this opening statement, I feel that this is the most likely objection and I feel obliged to address it in advance. The theist counter-argument on this basis would run like this:

"The Universe is unique, it is organised, complex and fine-tuned for life so the FC must have been intelligent and sentient"

In this argument, intelligence and sentience are invoked to solve a particular problem: Planning and Design of the Universe. The issue is not with the "physical" act of creating it. That act, in itself a complete mystery to us, only requires an entity that is "physically" capable of creating energy-matter out of nothing. It does not require intelligence. For example, imagine a non-sentient precursor (FC) which (like god) is uncaused and has only one property: it will create the Universe out of nothing. There's nothing wrong with this proposition. The difficulty lies in the design of the "complex" and "fine-tuned" Universe.

Now, is intelligence and sentience necessary to create the Universe with all its "complexity" and "fine-tuning"? I put these in quotation marks for a reason; I'm not conceding complexity or fine-tuning generally. I am, however, prepared to concede them for the time-being, just for the sake of this argument.

The answer is "No, not unless we first establish that there was a plan!"

But let's not dwell on that point as it in itself is grounds for an entire debate. Instead, let's focus on God. Whether or not intelligence is required to come up with the plan/design of the Universe (as a "complex and fine-tuned" entity), God fails to assist us here. Let's illustrate it by considering an essential attribute of God's; omniscience.

If God knows everything at all times then God (being uncaused, as per Craig's own argument above) must at all times have possessed the detailed knowledge of how to design and put into effect the Universe and that knowledge is in itself uncasued. An omniscient God can't have used his intelligence (if He has any) to design/plan the Universe. If you were born with the knowledge that on 24 December 2012 you will create a buildng AND with the knowledge of every detailed aspect of its design as well as how you will go about putting it together then you can't be said to have used your mind in creating the project. The project existed in your mind since birth; uncaused.

What follows is that by proposing an omniscient god, we throw the requirement of intelligence out the window.

Can we then propose a not-so-omniscient god? Well, I guess we can keep proposing all sorts of entities to close our GAP IN KNOWLEDGE. We can work hard on fine-tuning our god to help him fine-tune the Universe. We can use brute force if we have to. But we will still fail to answer Craig's opening question: why is there a [universe-wanting, very clever, very powerful and sentient god plus a universe] rather than nothing?


H) CONCLUSION

Craig's argument fails on a number of levels. Apart from engaging in two embarrassing Strawman claims, Craig proposes an FC with not a single attribute of a "mind" and then falsely claims that "only a mind can have these attributes". Furthermore, Craig's mind (to be a mind at all) must have attributes that the arguable FC doesn't need to have.

We don't have a proof for a god. What we do have is just another desperate attempt to prove that which could never (so far) be proven and to justify someone writing a book.

　

Comments are welcome,
@allocutus