Jesus - a failed philosopher

One of the most well-known (if not the single most well-known) of Christ's sayings is what can be found in Luke 6:31. Christ is there attributed with saying "Do to others as you would have them do to you."

I've heard countless folks (theist and atheist alike) exclaim what a great philosophy that is, how revolutionary it is and how ahead of its time it is. Even Richard Dawkins has considered Jesus to be way ahead of his time philosophically and morally (see The God Delusion). The (false, of course) credit given to Jesus for bringing us The Golden Rule is what some Christians claim makes Christianity unique amongst the world's religions; "unlike them", Christianity is "all about love".

The above moral principle ("do unto others...") is often referred to as a variation of The Golden Rule. Note that Christ was by no means alone in proposing The Golden Rule. A quick search of the internet will show that versions of it appeared in many other cultures, some before Christ's day. Indeed, a negative version of it ("don't do to others what you don't want done to yourself") was uttered by Hillel the Elder. When challenged by a Gentile to explain the Torah while the Gentile is standing on one foot, Hilel said the following: "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and learn" (see Wiki). And this was before Christ's birth.

Whilst we don't know whether Christ's version (if he existed and uttered it at all) of the Golden Rule was in fact copied from Hillel the Elder (Christ, the man, may well have been a follower of some of the latter's school of thought), it is interesting that nobody seems to bother to even give half a thought to what the saying means. I admit I never thought about it myself, until recently reading Godless (a book written by Dan Barker, a former preacher of many years, turned atheist). It seems that, being brought up with it, we don't even stop and think about it.

So, what does it really mean? Well, it means what it says. You should treat others the way you yourself want to be treated. But does that make sense? What are the consequences or benefits of this rule? Would you really want me to do to you what I like having done to myself? Would you (or anyone who gives it half a thought) want someone's subjective preference to be the criterion by which he is to treat everyone around them? I, for one, happen to like to crack silly jokes. I like teasing people and I like being teased. It was early in my professional career that I found that I can't treat people the way I want to be treated. I can't be as direct and as open and forward with them as I like others being with myself. Barker gives an interesting (and much better, athough possibly only hypothetical) example himself. He proposes a husband and wife. The husband likes being hugged while the wife likes hugging (huggee/hugger scenario). If the husband is to listen to Christ's commandment, he would have to hug his wife because he wants to be hugged. This is despite the fact that he doesn't want to hug! His wife, in turn, would end up being hugged even though she prefers to be the hugger! We end up with two unhappy (though actually 100% compatible when it comes to hugging!) people by merely following Christ's rule.

If we're talking about loving one another (and this is what Christ is talking about in the relevant chapter), I suggest that a much more meaningful (and workable) expression of love is to do to others what they want you to do to them as opposed to what you would like them to do to you. That principle makes a hundredfold more sense than the subjective, self-centered caricature that Jesus allegedly came up with. It would mean that people's wishes would actually be respected as opposed to being contingent on the preferences of someone else; someone who gets to arbitrarily choose what it is that he should do to you only because he likes it done to himself!

It would seem that even as a purely human philosopher and moralist, Christ has failed to rise to a truly impressive standard. After all, it doesn't take a genius to see the obvious and glaring flaw in the philosophy. And this is a failure for a man. Now imagine a perfect and divine being making that blooper.

God as source of morality? Can't be.

If God doesn't exist then why is it wrong to commit murder?

If only I had a penny for each time I've heard this question from a theist. But let's just think about what this means.

Let's assume God exists and told us that murder is wrong. Does this mean that it's only wrong because God said that it's wrong? Or does it mean that it's wrong anyway and God (being omniscient) knows this and has told us this?

1. Murder is wrong only because God said so

If murder is only wrong because God said so then there's really nothing objectively wrong with murder itself. God said that it's wrong and therefore it's wrong. If God said that it was right, it would be right. This is why it was right for the Jews to commit genocide when God ordered it. That's fine. I can't argue with this as a hypothesis. Except, a theist who holds this view must agree that they have nothing against murder itself; they only condemn it because that's what God said. If God told them to kill (or perhaps to fly planes into buildings) then they would gladly do it. Murder would be right because God said so. In fact, if murder is only wrong because God says it's wrong then murder isn't wrong at all. It's only forbidden at this point in time by an arbitary dictator (God).

When making this argument, I've sometimes had people reply to me that God would NEVER say that murder is right because God is a loving God. But if that's the case then (the multiple Biblical occasions of God commanding murder and even genocide aside) God isn't really the one who decides what's right or wrong in the first place. Rather, murder is wrong because allowing murder wouldn't be a loving thing to do. The actual measure of right and wrong isn't based on God's decision at all; it's based on an objective standard of what is or is not loving. God, as an omniscient and benevolent entity, simply follows the rules. But God didn't make those rules. So, if this is the case then God is not the answer to the question of "why is murder wrong?".

Another objection I've encountered is this: "God is unchageable. God said murder is wrong and therefore God will NEVER say that murder is right". I consider this to be a copout. If God is the true source of morality then God may want to change it. We simply can't know what makes murder wrong. God is the only one who knows. Who are we to disagree? God can even change the terms of His "covenant" (speaking the Biblical God now) with us. Nobody can stop Him. Nobody can say "but God, you told us that last one was the final one". God is the boss, not you.

2. Murder is wrong objectively; God is omniscient and has TOLD us the objective truth that murder is wrong

As I have pretty much addressed in the second paragraph of point 1 above, this means that God is not the answer to the question of "why is murder wrong?" Murder is wrong despite God and it would be wrong even if God didn't exist. God didn't create moral standards, He merely repeats them to us. We might as well take God out of the loop and instead go to the source of moral standards (whatever it is) directly. God fails to answer the question.

Conclusion:

God can't be the answer to moral questions because if He were, we'd have to conclude that we are completely devoid of a moral radar and that murder isn't wrong after all. It's forbidden by a higher authority who could, at any time, turn around and tell us to slaughter each other and those who believe in Him would do exactly that. Is this an objective morality? I think not. Remember that the Nuremberg defence is not that genocide is morally right. Rather, it's "I was just obeying orders".

Why God is mathematically improbable

Let's start with a simple mind experiment. If you're an atheist, ask yourself now how many times you've heard a theist say "prove to me that there's no god". If you're a theist, ask yourself how many times you've asked an atheist this very question.

An atheist will often say "there's no evidence that there's no god and therefore I think He probably doesn't exist" or words to that effect. A theist, on the other hand, is likely to say "absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence" or something along those lines.

I intend to show here (using simple mathematics) that god is indeed very improbable. Atheists will be probably disappointed with the figures we arrive at at the end. Don't be. Keep in mind at all times that this argument is designed to show that, even if we extend deliberate generousity to theist assumptions, the existence of a god is nevertheless statistically improbable.

Let us begin.

Some terms:

By way of introduction, let's make it clear that we will here be discussing the truth of propositions. The central question is what weight can be given to a proposition that is not supported by any evidence and how this impacts on the probability of God's existence.

In our discussion, a proposition is any claim that relates to a question of fact (as opposed to a normative value - eg we shouldn't kill - or preference). Thus, an example of a proposition is "The Sun is green". Another example of a proposition would be "The Sun is not green".

The second term I need to introduce is "Unevidenced Proposition" (UP). An unevidenced proposition is simply a proposition for which there is no evidence and against which there is no evidence. We could think of it as a hypothesis. Note that I am deliberately steering away from terms that have some conventional scientific usage. We are not here concerned with science (science is all about data and repeatable experimentation; things that don't apply to God for our purposes).

　

1. Equalizing the scale

Let's take an Unevidenced Proposition (UP) and consider the following three statements about that proposition. Note that I am deliberately speaking in general terms here without actually proposing a specific UP. We are trying to agree on rules regarding UP's generally. So, we are speaking of just any hypothetical Unevidence Proposition.

a) UP is more likely than not to be true;

b) UP is more likely than not to be untrue;

c) UP is equally likely to be true as it is to be untrue.

Remember that there is no evidence in favour of UP and there's no evidence against it. In these circumstances, which of the above three statements is true? I am going to ask us to agree that only (c ) is true. Some atheists (ironically) might object at this point. Don't worry, trust your DJ. And remember, we are going out of our way to be generous.

There is, however, a problem with the above. Take two Unevidenced Propositions: Rabbits exist on Pluto and Green Rabbits exist on Pluto. Clearly, we can't say that the probability of both propositions being true is equal. The Green Rabbits proposition contains an additional requirement. The odds (very small, I'd think) that there are ANY rabbits on Pluto must be greater than the odds that some of those rabbits are green. There might indeed be some weirdly adapted rabbits on Pluto and none of them green.

I propose to introduced a sub-class of Unevidenced Proposition. In fact, two subclasses: Simple Unevidenced Proposition and Compound Unevidenced Proposition.

Thus, A Simple Unevidenced Proposition (SUP) is a proposition for which and against which there is no known evidence and which doesn't depend on (consist of) any other unevidenced propositions.

A Compound Unevidenced Proposition (CUP), in turn, is a proposition for which and against which no evidence exists and which contains in itself another unevidenced proposition.

In this way, "There are rabbits on Pluto" would be a Simple Unevidenced Proposition (SUP)and "There are green rabbits on Pluto" would be a Compound Unevidenced Proposition (CUP).

So, what can we conclude about a, b and c above? For our purposes, it will suffice to restrict it to SUP's. Thus, a simple unevidenced proposition is equally likely as unlikely to be true. Once again, I am fully aware that the scientist in you may not be liking this suggestion. But again, I ask you to be patient and remember that we are being generous here. We should also remember that we are going to discuss the existence of God; arguably not something that falls within science in any event. It's not observable. God by definition resides outside our realm (for our purposes He will, anyway) and we can't really say that our observations of things inside the Universe allow us to extrapolate conclusions about things outside the Universe. This is part of the reason for my generosity here.

　

2. Let's do some maths

Since we are going to make probabilistic calculations, we need to put the above into some maths. We have agreed that the odds that a SUP is true are equal to the odds that it's not true. This means that we can comfortably assign the probability of 50% to every SUP. Thus P(SUP)=50% or 0.5.

3. Let's define God

There are many ways to define God. As a simple minimum, let's go with "non-material, timeless, omnipotent, omniscient, sentient, uncaused entity that created the Universe".

4. God is a Compound Unevidenced Proposition

There are a number of disctinct attributes of God. Each of those attributes is (in principle) possible to be possessed by a non-God being. It's only when we put all of them together that we have a true god. For instance, there may be lots of non-material or omniscient entities. Each of those aspects of God is in fact a Simple Unevidenced Proposition in itself. There's no evidence that a non-material being exists. There's no evidence that it doesn't either. There may be many or there may be none. But what about a being who is BOTH non-material AND timeless? Well, this now becomes a CUP - a Compount Unevidenced Proposition. Each of the two attributes is Simple Unevidenced (there's no evidence that timless OR non-material beings exist) and, in combination with each other, they form a Compound Unevidenced Proposition.

5. Let's calculate God's odds - P(G)

a) the odds that a non-material entity exists must be 50%

b) what are then the odds that this entity is also a timeless entity (or that an entity who is both exists)? In order to calculate these odds, we use the "AND" probabilistic operator. Thus, P(A AND B)= P(A) * P(B)

Our odds that a non-material and timeless entity exists are therefore .5*.5=.25=25%

c) what are the odds that an entity exists who is non-material, timeless and omnipotent? Once again, this is an unevidenced proposition and once again it receives the same treatment. We end up with .25*0.5=0.125=12.5%

d) and omniscient? 0.125*0.5=0.0625

e) sentient 0.0625*0.5=0.03125

f) uncaused: the above * 0.5 = 0.015 or 1.5%

g) creator of Universe: 0.75%

Now, I may have missed some definitional elements of God that some of us might like to include. Perhaps there are some who might disagree with some of the ones that I did include. But that's not important. It will not change the result overly dramatically. What is important is that, BASED ON the "no evidence for or against entitles us to equal odds" principle (which in itself is of course pure generosity towards theism!), the odds that God exists are only 0.75%.

And this confirms intuitively. There are huge numbers of hypothetical entities (probably infinite!) that we could in principle conceive of. Assuming a finite reality, only a finite number of them actually exist. Hence, the odds of correctly guessing out (without evidence) that a particular creature with particular attributes exists must be very low indeed.

Atheists know this. This is why they feel a little weird when a theist demands evidence that there's no god. To us, lack of evidence that a god does exist is a very prudent reason to start with the working assumption that no god exists indeed.

Comments are welcome

@allocutus

　

Ontological Argument Against God

Most or us are no doubt familiar with St Anselm's Ontological Argument for God's existence. For those who are not, it can be found here:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Anselm

Having thought about it a bit, I have realised that St Anselm doesn't give God enough credit. He limits God's greatness to "that which can be conceived of". But really, God must be greater than that. So here goes:


1. God is, in principle, such great a being that no greater being can exist

2. A being that is so great that we can't conceive of it is greater than a being that we can conceive of (our minds are limited in their ability to conceive)

3. Therefore God must, in principle, be a being that we can't conceive of

4. But we have conceived of God in 1&3 above

5. Therefore God doesn't exist



On a bright side, not all hope is lost. If we all stop believing (well, those who do) and stop conceiving of God, we might give rise to His existence. Just like Saint Anselm brings Him into the real world by simply imagining Him**. Shall we try?

**Who made that guy a saint? What were they thinking?

Complex Universe Disproves God

The complex Universe as evidence against God

In this post, I will seek to illustrate that the existence of the complex Universe is very powerful evidence against the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. Indeed, the same goes for any other claimed deity who possesses the characteristic of being the Universe's creator.


Assumption: The Universe must have had a cause

In order to consider this issue, we will proceed from the above assumption. That is, we assume that the Universe did not cause itself and did not spontaneously generate with no cause.


Equal or greater complexity of cause

In order for A to cause B (with no other factors at play; no other sources of information), A must be at least as complex as B.

By complexity, I don’t mean structural complexity. Rather, I’m referring to informational complexity.

Imagine an entity P (I will later also refer to it as P1) that causes the Universe. For our purposes, suppose that P is a non-sentient entity; it’s a “thing” that causes the Universe. P causes the Universe by transforming itself into it; in other words it somehow turns into the singularity and then explodes.

We must keep in mind that P is not governed by the physical laws as we know them. That’s because these laws are part of our Universe. P, having existed “prior” to the singularity, is not part of this Universe and therefore there are no grounds to assume that it’s governed by the same physical laws. Note that I don’t anticipate any objections at this point, at least not from theists. Theists posit the existence of a god who is not subject to the physical laws of the Universe. Equally, P is not. In fact, P creates these laws (by generating the Universe).

We don’t know what the structure of P is. But we do know that it’s capable of generating the Universe and that the Universe it will generate will necessarily expand into what we have today, with all its laws and the (very improbable, it is said) set of physical constants.

Hence, whatever the structure of P is (and it might indeed be physically a simple structure, though one might argue that it could not be; but that’s not relevant), P must contain all the information needed to generate something as complex as this Universe. Sure, it doesn’t have to have a map of where Andromeda will be at any specific time, or even that Andromeda will exist. But the precise position of objects in our Universe is not why we call it “complex”. A completely random, chaotic universe can be imagined which nevertheless has lots of objects flying chaotically and randomly with no set laws or constants (eg where each object runs by its own random laws).

And yet, in the sense in which the Universe's complexity (and, ultimately, its unlikelihood) is proposed, such a random chaotic universe would not be considered as complex and improbable as our existing Universe. And if it would, then we have to agree that there's nothing specifically improbable and complex about our Universe in the first place. This would potentially defeat the my argument. But it would also amount to a conclusion that the existence and nature of the Universe (as it is) cannot be used as evidence for the existence of a god; there being nothing particularly unlikely about the Universe's laws and constants.

All that said, it is traditionally claimed that the complexity of the Universe rests in the existence and nature of those laws and those constants. It is in this context and to this extent that P must contain all the complexity of the Universe.

In other words, P must be just as “informationally organised” as the Universe itself.


Improbability

It is often argued (and theists often rely on this) that the Universe, with its specific set of constants and laws is very improbable indeed. People have proposed numbers to represent this improbability and these numbers are nothing short of mindboggling.

There are many arguments against this proposition. Some claim that these constants are a result of a single property of the Universe (making it much less improbable), others take issue with the significance of the improbability for debates about the existence of a god and so forth. We are not interested in any of that in this discussion. We assume that the Universe, with its set of laws and constants, is indeed very, very improbable.

Now, let’s get back to our hypothetical entity, P. P is the entity that existed (in this scenario) “prior” to the singularity and its only property was that it would necessarily (via laws we don’t know or understand; laws contained in P itself) turn itself into the singularity which then would explode and give rise to the Universe as we know it.

My argument is that P must be at least as improbable as the singularity and as the Universe itself. This should be very simple to grasp and should not meet any reasonable objection. Why? Because for all practical purposes we might as well (we won’t, but I’m trying to illustrate something) say that P is the Universe in its earlier stage. Remember, P does nothing except for turning itself into the Universe as we know it. We could say it’s the Universe in an embryonic stage. P already contains all the data (in some structural form that we don’t and can’t know) for the generation of the Universe.

Since P contains information about every single of the Universal constants and every single of the Universal laws, it is in effect a “packed up” version of the Universe; an embryo. And because it contains al the information that is needed to give rise to this precise Universe (and no other!) it must be equally improbable as the Universe itself. After P transforms into the Universe as we know it, no further information is added. The complexity of information is equal between P and the Universe. No changes in informational complexity. Hence, the improbability must be equal (or even greater for P, but I don’t want to go that far; there’s no need).

To sum up, we have now the following scenario:

1. An entity P exists which then turns itself into the Universe as we know it. It has no capacity to do anything else except to transform into the Universe.

2. P is at least as improbable as the Universe itself.

Let’s now vary P a little.


P2 and U2

Now that we have this construct of P, let’s go a step further. Imagine a different version of P. We’ll call it P2.

P2 is exactly the same as P but it is a little bit more complex. P2 contains the information needed for generation of two alternative universes. One of those is our Universe (call it “U” or “U1”), with all of its complex constants and improbable laws. The other is an alternative universe (call it “U2”), with a different set of constants and different laws. Note that the constants and the laws of U2 are just as improbable (at least approximately so, depending on how many constants there are of course) as those of U. This is not particularly relevant but it is an interesting point to add.

We can play around and assume that U2 is a universe that’s tuned in to only do two things: Big Bangs and Big Crunches. If it gets generated, it will pulsate like that to forward infinity (forever and ever from the point of generation).

It’s not known whether P2 will give rise to U (our universe) or to U2 (the pulsating universe). The decision will be random and the randomiser is based on some property within P2 itself.


P2 is more improbable than P

Having introduced P2, I can now claim that P2 is more improbable than P. That’s because in addition to being able to generate U, it can also (but alternatively) generate U2. On top of this it contains an additional property; the randomiser.

Because P2 contains more information than P1, P2 is more improbable than P1. It’s more complex and more organised. Keep in mind, that it’s the Universe’s complexity and organisation that we claimed makes it so improbable in the first place.


Enter P3 – P2 with a twist

Now, imagine another P. We will call it P3. P3 has the same characteristics as P2 except that it is conscious and intelligent. It can actually think. Its thinking ability is very limited, however. The only thing that P3 can think about is whether to generate U1 or U2. In other words, the decision about which universe to generate is not random; it’s an intelligent decision.


P3 is more improbable than P2

It shouldn’t take more than a primary school diploma to quickly see that P3 must be more improbable than P2. That’s because in addition to the characteristics of P2, it has a third characteristic; intelligence.


A quick side-point about intelligence

We know that intelligence is a very rare thing. We also know how complex it is. There are many claims that the human brain is in fact more complex than the entire rest of the Universe. I don’t know if that refers to structural complexity or processing complexity (the ability to process information in this case) but that’s not important. What is important is that intelligence is an extremely complex and rare thing. If we agree on this, then the difference in improbability between P2 and P3 must be enormous indeed.


But a side-point it was; non-essential to the argument

The above paragraph should very quickly and very intuitively make it clear that P3 must be many times over more improbable than P2. But even without that, the very fact that P3 has this one additional characteristic makes it more improbable than P2.

We can safely conclude that P3 is at least a little bit (though one might say “a whole lot”) more improbable than P2.


Enter P 4

Now let’s imagine an entity P4. This entity is just like P3 except it’s not limited to generating only U1 or U2. P4 can generate any of an infinite (or at least a very very very large number) of potential universes.

Just as P3, P4 can intelligently decide which of these universes to generate. But unlike P3, P4 possesses the information for the generation of a huge multitude of universes, together with their sets of laws and constants. P4 is much more complex than P3.

Since P4 contains much more information than P3, P4 is more improbable than P3. It has at its disposal the complex structures of an almost infinite number of plausible universes (perhaps the number is in fact infinite).


Enter P5

P5 is our final entity. It is just like P4 but with an extra twist. P5 is unlimited in its ability. It can generate an infinite number of things, not just universes. There are no limits for P5. For our purposes, we can say that P5 is omnipotent.

In addition, P5 differs from the other P's in that it doesn't transform itself into the Universe; rather it creates it and then continues with its own, independent existence.


P5 is a great deal more improbable than P4, P3, P2, P1 or U1

Given that P5 has infinitely more characteristics and abilities than each of the other P’s, it is clear that P5 must be more improbable than all the other P’s.

And of course, since P2, P3 and P4 are more improbable than the Universe itself, P5 must be greatly more improbable than U1.


P5 is not God

No, P5 is not God. P5 only has some characteristics of God, at least insofar as the Judeo-Christian variety is concerned. The latter has many more characteristics; capacity to love, ability to make moral judgment etc etc etc.

But for our purposes, P5 has the minimum necessary ingredient of God; creational omnipotence.


Conclusion

I have just demonstrated that an entity with creational omnipotence is greatly (one might say infinitely) more improbable than the Universe itself.

What follows is that, even without the additional traits of love and morality etc, the concept of an intelligent and omnipotent entity that created the Universe (aka God) is a great deal more improbable than the Universe itself.

And it certainly is also a great deal (also possibly infinitely) more improbable than P1.

To sum up:

1. The Universe has a cause
2. That cause could be P1; a non-intelligent entity that just gives rise to the Universe and can’t do anything more
3. That cause could also be an intelligent, omnipotent entity, often referred to as God
4. God is a great deal (maybe even infinitely) more improbable than P1
5. Therefore, it is very, very unlikely that the Universe was created by a God
6. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is by definition the creator of the Universe (I will not be supporting this; this is obvious)
7. Therefore, combining 5 and 6, its is very, very unlikely that the Judeo-Christian God, as defined, exists.


Obvious objection followup

“Ah, Allo. But you’ve explained nothing. Just how does this P1 come into existence itself?”

I can just see this coming up in post 2.

The answers is: I don’t know. Just like you don’t know how God comes into existence. Saying “God is beyond time” doesn’t help. P1 is also beyond time as we know it, as is any entity that exists outside the Universe (time is part of the Universe). Saying “God is supernatural” doesn’t help. We might just as well call “P1” supernatural in the very same sense.

God could have spontaneously generated. Or always existed. Or created Himself. You can pick and choose. It makes no difference. Why? Because P1 could also have always existed. Or created itself. Or spontaneously generated.

Whilst this doesn’t answer the ultimate question of “where did the Universe come from”, this is not what this argument has sought to do. Wherever the Universe came from, it is very, very, very unlikely that it was created by an intelligent, omnipotent god. An almost infinitely more likely cause (and we did assume that a cause is needed) is the simple (in comparison, of course) P1.

P1; an entity whose origin we can’t explain any better (or worse) than God’s but which nevertheless is equally capable of generating the Universe and which is enormously (infinitely?) less unlikely than the Judeo-Christian deity.

God - the deadbeat who couldn't create a universe

If God is omniscient and uncaused then the design of the Universe is uncaused and God is no answer to the problem of the Universe's design.

There's something that has been bothering me for a while about people's beliefs in God the Creator.

Clearly, the single most common argument that theists use when defending their claim that a god exists is any of a series of cosmological arguments. This is fine, as long as getting us from existence of the Universe to existence of a First Cause goes (subject to some difficulties with disproving infinite regression). It's the next step that brings on difficulties; the claim that the First Cause must be intelligent and sentient. There have been many attempts, each meeting with its string of rebuttals. What I wanted to raise here is the "complexity/fine-tuning" claim.

Essentially all these complexity/fine-tuning claims (William Lane Craig's ridiculous "a mind or an abstract number did it" fallacy aside) rely on some aspects of the Universe that appear to be designed in a complex manner, all the way down to the "very, very improbable" set of universal constants, "designed to give rise to life (or sometimes it's said to be *intelligent life*) and/or to sustain it".

There are many problems with this argument. For instance, the argument is circular, it's anthropocentric, it appeals to special pleading and it proposes an entity that is necessarily more complex and fine-tuned than the Universe itself. But that's not what bothers me in this case. Rather, my problem here is Omniscience. It seems to me that an omniscient god is a useless deadbeat who can't have designed the Universe. Here's why.

Short syllogism:

A. God in all states of affairs knows everything about all states affairs (omniscience).

B. God in all states of affairs knows everything about Himself in all states of affairs (omniscience).

C. God is uncaused (axiomatic).

D. Since God in all states of affairs possess all knowledge and God is uncaused, God's knowledge is uncaused (A-C).

E. Any ideas, plans or designs that are derived from God are uncaused (from D).

F. If the design of the Universe is derived from God then the design of the Universe is uncaused (From E).

G. From F, if the design of the Universe is derived from God then God's intelligence or sentience is irrelevant to the generation of the Universe's design.

H. Hence, for the purposes of the existence of a complex/fine-tuned Universe, God's sentience or intelligence are redundant (from G).

I. (OPTIONAL) Therefore, God is a deadbeat conveyer of uncaused ideas.




Long version follows.



What is Omniscience?

Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omniscient) defines the term (or its derivative pronoun in this case) as follows:
1
: having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight
2
: possessed of universal or complete knowledge


What about theists? What, to them, is omniscience?

While the dictionary definition is clear enough, what should matter more here is what omniscience means in theology. Let's start with the Bible. What are God's claimed attributes when it comes to the issue of knowledge? Here are some examples.

a) No thought can be withholden from thee. (Job 42:2)
b) For He knoweth the secrets of the heart (Psalm 44:21)
c) For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things.
(1 John 3:20)


The Catholic Encyclopedia (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06612a.htm ) says the following about God's omniscience:
"That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things, follows from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows them individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad as well as what is good."

 

"That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things, follows from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows them individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad as well as what is good."

It is clear from the above that the Biblical God has definitionally perfect knowledge in that God knows absolutely everything. This is consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church, the largest Christian organisation in the world.

God's knoweldge is perfect. God "knows and comprehends Himself fully and adequately". This must mean that God knows at all times all the decisions he's ever made and all the decisions he ever will make. One might here argue that God is "timeless" and therefore the term "will make" is not applicable to God. That's fine but it makes no difference to my argument. Whatever being "timeless" means, the fact of the matter is that God in all states of affairs knows everything about all states of affairs.


If God is omniscient, God can't design the Universe

Since God possesses all knowledge of all things (including Himself) in all states of affairs, this means that God must in all states of affairs know all the decisions He will make, makes or has made in all states of affairs. God possesses complete and uncaused knowledge. This knowledge includes a complete and uncaused knowledge about how the Universe is to be created (or is created or was created) and what properties the Universe is to possess (or possesses or has possessed). Indeed, the entire design of the Universe (along with whatever process God used to design it) is uncaused. It exists in the mind of god without a cause.

When I say 'without a cause' I'm actually including God Himself. God did not (could not) cause the plan of the Universe's design. That's because this plan is part of God's knowledge and God's knowledge by its very nature includes knowledge of all things. God has at all points in all states of affairs known what that design is. There is not and has never been and will never be such a state of affairs where God exists but does not possess the complete knowledge of the Universe's design. A human analogy would be a man who is born with the knowledge of how to design the world's most sophisticated aircraft. Every detail of this design was present in the man's mind since he was born. Clearly, then, the man did not need to even think about the design. He did not have to change its plan from any state to any other state. The plan was complete ever since the man was born and the man's intelligence (in terms of reasoning) did not contribute at all to this design.

But here's the problem: if the design itself exists uncaused (in all states of affairs in the memory bank of God) then the existence of a sentient and intelligent entity does not explain the existence of the design. God's intelligence (or sentience) had no contribution to the existence of the design. Therefore, they are redundant as attributes of God the Creator.

What this means is that, on the most common theist understanding of God's nature (omniscient), God fails to answer the question of the Universe's complexity or its apparent fine-tuning to sustain life. If God is omniscient then God's intelligence and sentience are redundant to the creation of the Universe's design. God is as good an explanation as any First Cause who uncausedly has in it the entire plan of the entire Universe which (just as good as random) just happens to uncausedly exist within the nature of the First Cause.


Occam's Razor and the alternative

A more economically effiicient solution (let's have a shave with Occam) would therefore be a First Cause in whose nature it uncausedly is to create the Universe (with the very same properties) and to do nothing else and who is neither intelligent nor sentient. Yes, of course, we don't know anything about what type of First Cause this might be. But that's ok because we have no idea what type of First Cause a god is either.


Conclusion

An omniscient God is no explanation of the Universe's design. If God is omniscient then the Universe's design is uncaused and God is an intellectual deadbeat.

William Lane Craig Cosmological Fallacy

In his debate with Hitchens, Craig presents three arguments for the existence of God. In this post, I will deal with the first argument; the Cosmological Argument. This is written in response to a twitter user named @kipkenyan.

Note that I'm not addressing any arguments made by Hitchens, nor any replies by Craig. I'm simply attacking his opening argument.


A) Craig's Strawman

Craig opens up with the question of "why anything at all exists". He claims this question is the most profound question in philosophy. He then commits a fashionable Strawman by asserting that "typically atheists have answered this question by saying the Universe is eternal and uncaused". This is of course untrue. Atheists don't typically claim to know where the Universe came from or what caused it. They simply reject the position that it was caused by a god. Many atheists don't even bother with this question at all. They simply go about their lives without believing that there is a god. Those who do ponder the question often leave it for the scientists to answer. And so it should be. The sheer fact that I don't believe in a god doesn't qualify me in the field of physics or cosmology. I'm therefore in no position, and under no obligation, to answer such questions. Curiously, if theist arguments are anything to go by, theists think that believing in a god magically makes them qualified in the above fields. While this little Strawman of Craig's raises an interesting point about his integrity (or his knowledge about what atheism actually is), I will not spend any more time on that. It's not particularly relevant to Craig's Cosmological argument itself.


B) The question REMAINS unanswered

The second interesting point to make is that the question of "why is there anything rather than nothing" cannot possibly be answered with "god". The reason is that "god" is PART OF "everything". In other words, when we ask "why is there anything rather than nothing?", that question (if it's to mean anything) must refer to the entire set of things that exist (SOTTE from now on - see note 1 below) - everything that exists. If a god and a single universe exist, the question is "why is there a god and universe as opposed to there being no god and no universe?". If a god and a number (say, X) of universes exist, the question is "why is there a god and X universes as opposed to nothing?". If no god exists and the universe is uncaused, the question is "why is there a universe rather than nothing?". If no god exists and the universe is caused by a single cause (which, like the hypothetical god, is uncaused) then the question would be "why is there a universe and a single uncaused cause?". I could go on longer with more conceivable permutations but I think the point has been made. "God" doesn't answer the question of why there's anything as opposed to nothing. God is simply a bandaid to relieve immediate bleeding.

So, if I were to ask a theist "why is there a universe plus god as opposed to no universe and no god?", I'd likely get the following answer:

"The universe exists because God has created it and God Himself is uncaused".

That's very nice but it necessarily entails some serious special pleading. If the theist is willing to concede that an uncaused entity (in this case God) can exist, how can the theist exclude that the Universe itself (in this case when I say "Universe" I mean the Singularity) was uncaused or (if the Singularity itself does have a cause) that the Universe (again, in the broader sense that includes the Singularity) had a non-god cause that itself was uncaused?

I have asked theists this question before and have received answers along the following lines:

"God can exists uncaused because that's what God is by definition. Nothing else can".

The above is, of course, a copout. It's dishonest. It's special pleading. We DON'T KNOW what attributes God has because there's no evidence that a god exists in the first place. Theists have invented a god (without any evidence) to fill this precise gap.

But why did they give this entity the attributes of intelligence and sentience? There are a number of answers to this question. These include the "complex (fine-tuned) nature of the Universe" and the existence of intelligent life in it. Each of those arguments is easily refutable. However, since Craig does not rely on either of them in his opening statement of the Hitch debate, I don't intend to argue them at this juncture.

The only point I wish to make at this time is that God is not an answer to the question of "why there is something rather than nothing".

Note 1: I originally used the term "Cosmos" to denote "everything that exist, including a god if one exists". It was not the appropriate word, as @scotsmanmatt has pointed out. He's correct to the extent that theologians define "cosmos" to exclude the Creator but include the Universe. That said, as long as I made my meaning clear (which I surely did), there ought to be no dispute about it. It's the concept that matters on not the tag you give it. Evidently, @scotsmanmatt couldn't find anything of substance to pick on.



C) Craig's argument itself goes as follows:

1. The Universe is not eternal. It had a beginning 13.7 billion years ago, when it started from a Singularity.

My comment:

Yes, it's certainly true that the Unvierse AS WE KNOW IT began in a Big Bang, some 13.7 billion years ago. Of course, we don't know what (if anything) caused it. It's the proponent who must prove that the Universe was caused by god.


2. An atheist who accepts the Big Bang would have to believe that the Universe came from nothing and by nothing (Craig's words).

My comment:

No, that's not true. We simply don't know what the Universe came form and "by what". Indeed, it's the theists who suggest that the Universe came from nothing. They posit that God created matter and energy OUT OF NOTHING. Atheists generally don't take a firm view on this question. Scientists believe that the Singularity contained (in very small space, some would say infinitely small) all the matter and energy that exists today (possibly even more as some scientists posit that 90+% of initial matter and energy cancelled each other out and what remains is but a small fraction). We don't know what (if anything) caused the singularity itself. There are a number of hypotheses advanced by a number of scientists. It may well be that we'll never be able to find out.

The bottom line is that atheists don't at all claim that the Universe came from nothing. Most simply say that they don't know what (if anything) caused the Singularity. This demonstrates yet another Strawman by Mr Craig.

Not only is it a Strawman; it's also comical. Craig claims that nothing can come from nothing and yet he himself proposes a god who creates matter and energy from...you guessed it...NOTHING. What does that explain? Yes, you guessed it again, NOTHING. But more on this a little later.


3. Since it doesn't make sense that the Universe came from nothing, there must be a cause that brought the Universe into being.

My comment:

Let's grant Craig this, for the sake of the argument. Let's agree that there must have been a cause that brought the Universe into being.


4. The cause (let's call it FC from now on; First Cause) must have been a timeless, spaceless, immaterial being of unphathomable power.

My comment:

a) The FC was timeless

Craig doesn't define this word. Just what does "timeless" mean? What is time? Essentially, time is the rate at which things happen. In order for time to exist, there must be different states of affairs connected causally. For instance, take cold water. The water is in a pot and heat is acting upon it. The water becomes boiling water. Its energy properties have changed. One state of affairs has changed into another state of affairs. This change denotes that there must be TIME. Time is the measure of the rate at which this process has taken place. Whenever things happen, there is some type of time.

Another example would be a thought process. Imagine a mind that makes a decision, for instance a decision to create a universe. There must be a state of affairs where the mind exists but there is no decision to create a universe. There must also be an action in the mind (a thought) that results in the decision to make a universe. Then there must be a state of affairs in which there exists a (made by this mind) decision to create a universe. A being who makes this decision cannot be a timeless being because there have been at least two different states of affairs involving that being. There has been a change. There must have been some type of time. The alternative would mean that the decision existed while not existing and this of course is a logical contradiction.

How then could FC be timeless? There seem to be only two possible ways:

i) the being did not engage in any cause-effect activity at all until its decision (or action) of creating the Universe. This means that the being could not think, plan, or even exist in any meaningful way. Such a being would be DORMANT, HIBERNATING. It would have to "wake up" without a cause and then decide to create the Universe.

But a being who creates the Universe WITHOUT A CAUSE (such as a thought process, decision-making etc) is not a being that needs to be sentient or intelligent. It's as good as a random generation of the Universe.

What about a being who "wakes up" from eternal (or "timeless") hibernation to start a process of thinking which results in a decision to create? Does that alleviate the above problem? No. For all intents and purposes, the being was without existence (functionless) until it "woke up". It woke up with a full set of faculties to engage in the process of creation. If such a being can wake up spontaneously, why can't the Universe (or some non-sentient precursor of it) come into existence spontaneously? Of course it can. To say otherwise would be to engage in special pleading.

But that's not the only problem here. Perhaps a bigger problem is that a being who was hybernating and woke up to engage in a thought process is no longer a timeless being for our purposes. Commencing with the state of affairs in which it wakes up and moving on to all other states of affairs causally flowing from that state of affairs, the entity is subject to some type of time. We have a change between states of affairs and that change moves in one direction only.

Thus, a timeless creator is a creator who has idled away (without even knowing of its own existence; awareness requires thought and that's a process which gives rise to causative time) and uncausedly sprung into action. Such a creator is no better an explanation than a random, uncaused generation of the Universe (or a of a non-sentient cause of it) in the first place. In fact, the latter is more economical as it doesn't require intelligence and sentience. Occam kills God.

ii) Logical contradiction. The second conceivable way in which FC could be timeless is via a logical contradiction. Thus, we'd be saying that logic doesn't bind the entity in question (indeed, theists sometimes do posit that God isn't limited by logic). In this way, we could say that the decision to make the Universe existed simultaneously with it not-existing. Note that I'm not particularly interested in arguing about whether logic is truly universal (and applies to god) or not. The point is moot. Why? Because if the laws of logic did not apply to FC then there's no basis to say anything about the FC. The FC could create the Universe while not creating the Universe. Indeed, FC could exist while not existing. To go further, if the laws of logic don't apply outside the Universe then there's no requirement that the Universe have a cause at all. By abandoning logic, we abandon any and all ability to say anything meaningful about the First Cause (including "it exists").

The conclusion here is that a timeless FC is either one that would be no better an explanation than a random creation of the Universe OR one that would have to defy logic and thereby obliterate any ability for discourse.

b) Spaceless

My comment:

I don't take issue with Craig's claim that the FC must have been spaceless. Assuming that no space at all exists outside our Universe, that assertion is true. In any event, let's grant it to Craig.

c). Non-material

Craig claims that the Cause of the Universe must have been immaterial. This is, of course, because the Universe is said to contain all matter and energy that exists.

My comment:

While it is true that (given the assumption above) the Cause of the Universe must have been immaterial (in the "non-material" sense; the choice of words was Crag's, not mine!), it also must have been something that is capable of INTERACTING with matter, right down to the point of creating the same (either from nothing or from some other pre-existing "substance").

What kinds of things are there that are immaterial but are capable of interacting with matter, to the point of creating the same ex nihilo? For my part, I don't know. I have no idea. Us humans have never experienced energy-matter (we know now that the two are interchangeable and I'll use the two words interchangeably) being created out of nothing and we are in no position to comment what type of entity could achieve such a task.

What entity does Craig propose? He proposes a mind! Now, I wonder what minds Craig has been dealing with. Clearly they can't be the same types of minds that are known to humanity. We don't know of any minds that can at all interact (without being in control of a physical body, that is) with energy-matter, let alone create the same out of nothing!

"Ah-huh", I can hear a retort, "but this is a special kind of mind. One of its kind. It's GOD'S mind".

Let's remember this when we get to the gist of my attack of Craig's argument (yes, the gist is coming soon)

d) Of unfathomable power

My comment:

Well yes, in the sense that the Cause is capable of creating an entire universe, its power (power to react with or create matter) is truly unfathomable, at least given our current knowledge of the world.


D) Craig's conclusion

What does Craig conclude from the above? Here it comes:

"There are only two kinds of things that meet this description: either an abstract object like numbers or a personal mind. Abstract objects can't do anything. That leaves a mind. A personal creator."

This is it folks! This is Craig's cosmological argument. But hang on a minute! This can't be right! Just how does a mind meet "this description"?

[1] Timeless mind?

Is a mind timeless? No, not any minds that we have ever heard of.

Indeed, the only minds we know of happen to process information by thinking about it. One thought leads to the next in a long series of thoughts. This is activity and it's a cause-effect process and it denotes time. No mind that we know of can be timeless. In fact, if a mind were timeless, it would have to be dormant and therefore would be incapable of doing the one thing that minds do: thinking.

[2] Immaterial mind?

Can a mind be immaterial? Again, we don't know of any minds that can exist without a body. Despite the large numbers of claims about ghosts, there is not a single confirmed sighting, let alone any empirical evidence of a ghost having a sentient and intelligent mind (as opposed to being a semi-transparent apparition of sorts). Intelligent and sentient minds are something that we know of as a product of a physical brain. Despite many attempts, there has never been any study that would successfully demonstrate that dualism is true.

[3] Spaceless mind?

What about "spaceless"? Are minds spaceless? Now, that might be true, in the sense that the mind is the PROCESS of thought, knowledge and experience. The mind itself is not the material body (brain) that it is based in. But can a mind exist in a spaceless state of affairs? Again, not if we mean any type of minds that we have had an opportunity to deal with or observe.

[4] Mind of unfathomable power?

What about minds who have unfathomable power? Remember, in this context, "unfathomable power" must mean that the entity in question is capable of creating an entire Universe. The "power" in this context is not referring to "processing power" (aka intelligence). Why not? Because there's nothing in Craig's argument that demands that the First Cause have intelligence in the first place. Craig is not running a "fine-tuning" argument here. But even if he were, this wouldn't help him, for reasons that I will not go into here (but will touch upon it further down).


E) Craig's conclusion FAILS.

So, Craig has given us a list of things that he claims meet the criteria required by the First Cause. The list is populated by two things: abstract concepts such as numbers and a personal mind. I'm not going to address abstract concepts at any length. Let's stick to minds. Of the four attributes (timeless, immaterial, spaceless, of unfathomable power) of the FC, minds (as we know them) possess precisely zero.

Not only do none of the attributes of the FC outlined by Craig exist in a mind, but the FC lacks (on Craig's argument) the only attributes that do define a mind. A timeless or immaterial or spaceless or very powerful mind could exist in principle. But it won't be a mind unless it is sentient (at least) and intelligent (preferably, one might think). But none of these attributes are necessary for the FC to possess, on Craig's argument.

Thus, both of the following are true:

- The argued First Cause's necessary attributes lack all attributes of minds;

AND

- The mind's known attributes lack all argued attributes of the First Cause.

What follows is that there's no basis whatsoever to claim that the First Cause was a mind (aka Personal Creator).


F) Some special pleading

Of course, one can argue that the Mind in question is unlike all known minds. It transcends the limitations that minds within the Universe are subject to. It's truly special. It therefore IS timeless, spaceless, immaterial and capable of creating matter out of thin nothing.

The problem here is that, since we're willing to conjure up a mind that has nothing in common with what we mean by "mind", one that doesn't need to have intelligence or sentience and one that has four un-mind-like attributes, we are engaging in special pleading that is nothing short of monumental.

What's then to stop us from doing special pleading in the other direction? Why can't we just posit a special, non-intelligent non-sentient FC? Something like the claimed god but which lacks intelligence and sentience. It has the "physical" ability to create the Universe. It's timeless and therefore the action of creating the Universe is random and uncaused (just as the claimed God's "waking up" would have to be). Indeed, such a solution would be more economical than the claimed God. It would not have to possess two redundant attributes; intelligence and sentience.

A further problem with this special pleading is that it involves double-standards in the application of empirical knowledge. On the one hand, Craig attempts to invoke "the mind" on the basis of the types of entities that we know of (otherwise, he wouldn't be claiming that there are only two options; mind and abstract numbers; instead he would simply agree with us atheists in saying that we don't know what caused the Big Bang, if anything). On the other hand, he attempts to resolve the problem by invoking a thing that we don't know of; a mind that doesn't need any of the usual characteristics of a mind and that has four characteristics not possessed by any known mind. He might as well say "I propose a weird invisible flying giraffe who likes to dance Can-Can".


G) Fine-tuning objections

While Craig did not argue fine-tuning (or the complexity of the Universe) in this opening statement, I feel that this is the most likely objection and I feel obliged to address it in advance. The theist counter-argument on this basis would run like this:

"The Universe is unique, it is organised, complex and fine-tuned for life so the FC must have been intelligent and sentient"

In this argument, intelligence and sentience are invoked to solve a particular problem: Planning and Design of the Universe. The issue is not with the "physical" act of creating it. That act, in itself a complete mystery to us, only requires an entity that is "physically" capable of creating energy-matter out of nothing. It does not require intelligence. For example, imagine a non-sentient precursor (FC) which (like god) is uncaused and has only one property: it will create the Universe out of nothing. There's nothing wrong with this proposition. The difficulty lies in the design of the "complex" and "fine-tuned" Universe.

Now, is intelligence and sentience necessary to create the Universe with all its "complexity" and "fine-tuning"? I put these in quotation marks for a reason; I'm not conceding complexity or fine-tuning generally. I am, however, prepared to concede them for the time-being, just for the sake of this argument.

The answer is "No, not unless we first establish that there was a plan!"

But let's not dwell on that point as it in itself is grounds for an entire debate. Instead, let's focus on God. Whether or not intelligence is required to come up with the plan/design of the Universe (as a "complex and fine-tuned" entity), God fails to assist us here. Let's illustrate it by considering an essential attribute of God's; omniscience.

If God knows everything at all times then God (being uncaused, as per Craig's own argument above) must at all times have possessed the detailed knowledge of how to design and put into effect the Universe and that knowledge is in itself uncasued. An omniscient God can't have used his intelligence (if He has any) to design/plan the Universe. If you were born with the knowledge that on 24 December 2012 you will create a buildng AND with the knowledge of every detailed aspect of its design as well as how you will go about putting it together then you can't be said to have used your mind in creating the project. The project existed in your mind since birth; uncaused.

What follows is that by proposing an omniscient god, we throw the requirement of intelligence out the window.

Can we then propose a not-so-omniscient god? Well, I guess we can keep proposing all sorts of entities to close our GAP IN KNOWLEDGE. We can work hard on fine-tuning our god to help him fine-tune the Universe. We can use brute force if we have to. But we will still fail to answer Craig's opening question: why is there a [universe-wanting, very clever, very powerful and sentient god plus a universe] rather than nothing?


H) CONCLUSION

Craig's argument fails on a number of levels. Apart from engaging in two embarrassing Strawman claims, Craig proposes an FC with not a single attribute of a "mind" and then falsely claims that "only a mind can have these attributes". Furthermore, Craig's mind (to be a mind at all) must have attributes that the arguable FC doesn't need to have.

We don't have a proof for a god. What we do have is just another desperate attempt to prove that which could never (so far) be proven and to justify someone writing a book.

　

Comments are welcome,
@allocutus

　

　

　

Why theism is irrational

In this post I will discuss a number of common reasons why people claim to believe in God. I intend to discuss them in the context of a person becoming a theist. I will claim that the default position is that of an atheist and that there must be a reason to start believing in the first place. I will then attempt to show that none of the reasons I list are rational. This is not to say that no other reasons to turn to God exist. Although I can’t claim to be exhaustive, I will try to cover as much field as time permits.

The meaning of theism for this argument

Clearly, if I am going to discuss theism, I need to first ascertain what it is that I mean by that concept.

In this thread, when I refer to “theism” I refer to a belief in a God or gods. By this I mean sentient and supernatural entities who are, to some extent, omnipotent. This doesn’t have to mean that they are absolutely omnipotent. It just means that they are very, very powerful. I also want to limit this to a belief in a God who has created the universe and humans. The latter need not be direct creation. Thus, if one believes in a God who created the “singularity” and all the laws of nature that govern the singularity and the matter and energy that arises out of it, he is not precluded from being classified as a theist for the purposes of this discussion. However, the being has to be sentient. So, for example, when discussing a cosmological aspect, positing that something out there must have “pushed” the singularity to explode, will not be considered a theist belief. Not unless that “something” is believed to be sentient in the sense that it has self awareness and the awareness of other things and that it has will and can make decisions and act upon those decisions.

An “atheist”, by contrast, is somebody who’s not a theist. Broadly speaking, this may mean many different things. For example, one can be an atheist in one God but a theist in another. But for our purposes, and to keep things simple, an atheist is anyone who doesn’t believe in the entity or class of entities that I have described in the foregoing paragraph. When I say “doesn’t believe” I am simply referring to a lack of belief. It doesn’t have to go all the way to “strong atheism” (ie, a belief that no such entity exists). It’s enough that a person has no belief in such an entity.

Lack of theism is the default position

I believe that lack of theism is the default position. When people are born, they do not have any belief in God. They have no knowledge of the concept of God, nor do they have the mental ability to obtain such knowledge such early a stage of mental development.

One might argue that a newborn can’t be an atheist precisely because he doesn’t have any ability to either have faith or not. Thus, a newborn is neither a theist nor an atheist; he is simply a-philosophical (for want of a better term). To avoid going on a lengthy tangent on that detail, I am happy with that position. Thus, for those who would feel inclined to embark on this line of argument, “atheism” can be redefined to state that “a person is an atheist if he is capable of understanding the meaning of belief in a God or gods and lacks a belief in a God or gods.” This would mean that a newborn is not an atheist but at some stage during development a child becomes one as he becomes capable of understanding the meaning of belief in a God or gods.

What follows from the above is that, while the default position (that is, the position at birth) is not necessarily atheistic, it certainly can’t be theistic. A newborn is either an atheist or “non-philosophical”. In either of those cases, the newborn is not a theist. It's an atheist, an apatheist, a non-theist or a nonbeliever. Tags don't really matter.

Since the default position is that of not being a theist, becoming a theist is a positive step. When I say “positive” I don’t mean it in the sense of “good step”. I simply mean that it is some occurrence or some action or some change of state that has to take place in order for the person to become a theist; if nothing at all happens, the person will remain an atheist. I use the term “atheist” at this point because the person I am discussing is necessarily at the stage of development where he is capable of becoming a theist and must therefore be capable of understanding the meaning of belief. This, in turn means, that he is no longer “non-philosophical” but is now an atheist (in the weak sense). Again, this is just a tag and this is just for convenience.

The question for consideration is this: what reason can there be for a person to change their position from atheist to theist? Would such a change be rational? I will attempt to show that it would not be.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

I feel compelled to make a short statement about the above principle. Since absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, the fact that there is no rational ground for believing in God (if there isn’t one) is not in itself enough to conclude that God doesn’t exist. However, I am not setting out to show that God doesn’t exist. My attempt is focused only on showing that there is no rational reason for believing in God. If we accept my proposition above that the default position is necessarily an atheist one, it should be clear that in order to become a theist, one needs to change the status quo. This requires a positive act. And a positive act without a rational reason is an unnecessary positive act. Changing the status quo without a rational reason would be changing it just for the “hell of it” (no pun). And of course, I can’t dispute anyone who claims that he has become a theist simply for the hell of it. However, I would think that many a theist would get greatly offended if I were to suggest to them that they became theists for such a silly reason.

Scope of the problem

In order to address the question, I intend to look at a number of possible reasons a person might have to change from being an atheist to being a theist. Of course, I can’t be sure that the list is exhaustive and I am likely to leave some things out. Broadly speaking, however, the following categories of reasons exist:

1. “Knowledge”. This category consists of empirical observations of God or of God’s actions (such as Biblical and other scriptural accounts), and personal revelations. However, this category also extends to some logical a priori “proofs” for the existence of God. These are teleological proofs, ontological proofs and cosmological proofs. Thus, a person could become a theist in an intellectual sense; believing that convincing evidence and/or argument exists for God’s existence.

2. Considerations of “purpose”. This is not as clear a category as “knowledge”. Reasoning that falls within this category involves questions of evil and moral right, of justice and of eternal life. People who believe that “there must be a better place than this; one where evil never wins” or that “it would make no sense for us just to die and to be no more; hence there must be an eternal life of some sort” fall within this category. This category, thus, is more focused on some sort of wishful thinking rather than on any objective analysis of available evidence of any kind.

3. Pascal’s Wager. Surprising as this might be, there are actually theists who claim that they have chosen to believe in God because they would rather be wrong if God doesn’t exist than they would be wrong if God does exist. Risking going to hell is a much higher price than living one’s life following the doctrines of a God who doesn’t exist. They have nothing to lose by doing the latter but potentially a lot to lose by doing the former.

4. Cultural reasons, tradition, upbringing etc. Many people believe in God because they have been brought up that way. Their culture and tradition is a theistic one and they simply assimilate with this culture as they grow up. They are taught by their parents that there is a God who loves them every much.

Combination of reasons

Naturally, it’s not possible (nor would it make any sense at all) to claim that every person who becomes a theist does so due to any one of the above reasons in isolation. Rather, this may be (and probably often is) a combination of some of the above and possibly of some others that I haven’t even addressed. Let us consider whether this affects my position in terms of rationality.

Firstly, let us assume that a particular reason is rational. I will not nominate that reason but we will just call it “R”. So, R is a rational reason to become a theist in the sense that R is a conclusion based on rational and solid evidence of God’s existence and/or of the viability of engaging in the practice of some particular faith. If R is a good and rational reason to become a theist then it doesn’t matter whether any of the remaining reasons are rational. It’s enough to simply rely on R. If all the other reasons to become a theist are not rational, it would make little sense to combine R with those reasons. R is sufficient to stand as a good and solid reason to change from an atheist to a theist.

If, on the other hand, no rational reason exists, does it make any sense to combine any number of irrational reasons and then to rely on them and become a theist? I assert it does not. The fact that you have a number of irrational reasons doesn’t make any of them more rational unless a special case can be established such that a particular irrational reason becomes rational by the fact that another irrational reason exists which on its own merits makes the former rational. But if that were the case then the former reason could be stated as a rational reason in the first place by simply including in itself whatever element it is of the latter that makes it rational. None of the reasons I have outlined above (and will address below) are, as far as I can see, capable of becoming any more rational than they are, simply by combining them with any other of the above reasons.

For example, if the Bible can’t be relied on (category 1) for factual assertions about God and if the cosmological argument (category 2) is not logically sound, the facts that we have the Bible and that we have the cosmological argument do not in combination make either the Bible’s accuracy any better nor do they make the cosmological argument any more logically sound. If all our relatives believe in God this doesn’t mean we should (without some other reason). The fact that we have the Bible doesn’t give us that reason if the Bible can’t be relied on for factual assertions. And vice-versa, the fact that our relatives believe in God does not make the Bible any more reliable in terms of factual assertions.

I would conclude that, unless a specific case can be made out, a combination of irrational factors which do not affect each other’s rationality in some specific way that can be shown, does not of itself make any of them more rational.

And if that is the case, then showing that each of the above factors is irrational in itself is sufficient to dismiss it from our list of reasons to believe in God.

I will now address the reasons for becoming a theist (as I see them).



Knowledge

Scriptural and other accounts.

There are a large number of religions with their scriptural accounts of what God is, what God’s commandments are, how we are supposed to behave, what the rewards and punishments for certain types of behaviours are. There are as many of these accounts as there are religions. Not all of these accounts are written. Some do not show on any permanent record at all but rather are passed on from one generation of believers to the next. Apart from being vastly different between the various religions of the world, these accounts are open to a plaethora of different interpretations in themselves. Many believers claim that these messages should be taken literally. Others claim that they are symbolic in nature. Yet others claim that they are partially literal and partially symbolic.

Since there are a large number of proposed religions, there is absolutely no reason why one should be preferred to another. In other words, it’s not possible to know at all that one religion’s message is more accurate than that of another or which religion it is that holds the more accurate message. In absence of independent evidence by which to assess the truth of any of these claims, there is no rational reason to choose one over another.

Thus, we can’t know if it’s more likely that the sun, moon and stars were vomited into existence by a white giant called Mbombo (this sound like an FSM-like claim but is actually an African religious belief – Bakuba People) or whether the world is a vast ocean on the backbone of an enormous trout created by Kamaiu (Ainu beliefs in Asia) or whether the Universe has always existed and always will exist (Jainism), or whether God created the world and humans in 6 days and rested on the 7th (Judaist/Christian Biblical belief in its literal sense). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creation_mythology#Europe

These accounts are hugely inconsistent with each other. Similarly, the accounts of what God (or gods) is (or are) are inconsistent between the various religions. Ancient Greek gods were capable of hurting and punishing each other and all had their own motivations and their virtues and vices individually. Australian Aboriginal deities were animal-like in nature and much supernatural happened during “Dreamtime”. There are those who believe that God is an alien from outer space. It is beyond any question that there are huge numbers of mutually inconsistent beliefs in a huge numbers of various gods whose nature and attributes differ from all others in many different ways.

These gods have little in common safe and except the fact that it is more often than not believed that they are responsible for our existence. This is hardly surprising, given that humans have a natural curiosity when it comes to this very question: where did we come from? The question is so common to our nature that it is even asked by very young children. Thus, if we were to say that people in ancient times sought an explanation for that great question of existence and filled the gap with an invented God (who would usually be either human-like or animal-like), would that be surprising at all?

At this point, we have an unquestionable fact that can be broken down as follows:

1. Accounts of God and gods and their nature and attributes vary irreconcilably between the various religions of the world; both past and present;

2. There exists no independent yardstick to determine the veracity of one account against that of any other account;

3. Therefore some of those accounts must be incorrect and we can’t know which ones (if any) are correct.

The only conclusion from the above that I can think of is that we can’t know what accounts to rely on. Does that mean that we should dismiss all of them as untrue? Yes. We simply can’t accept any single one of them as true. Starting from the default position of atheism, we cannot, with a straight face, accept any single account to the exclusion of all others. In the absence of any independent criteria for veracity, it would be irrational to choose one at random.

The other point to make at this time is that these accounts are in many aspects contradictory to what we know about the world around us, having learned about it through observation and logical interpretations of that observation: science. When faced with the choice of accepting any one of the many contradicting accounts and at the same time rejecting science and reason and the alternative choice of rejecting all of those accounts and accepting science and reason, I submit that the latter is the more rational choice.

Let me give you a hypothetical example:

Hearsay reports exist that a train crash occurred at a particular level-crossing. Here are some accounts from various sources:

1. Mum told me she saw two trains in a head-on collision.
2. Jenny told me that she saw a train derail itself while negotiating the bend.
3. Mark said his brother saw a train collide with a semi-trailer.
4. Allison said she saw a jumbo jet fall on a train.

Upon investigation, we find that there was a train that broke down at the level crossing. Investigators are not sure yet what caused the breakdown.

We can treat the train as the beginning of the universe. If we do, science agrees that the question is worthy of investigation. Anything else is a speculation. Choosing the 7 day theory over Mbombo vomiting is irrational. Each is based on a set of beliefs that was once or is held by some theists. All we know is that the universe as we know it has had a beginning (well, it might not, but let’s just assume that for the sake of argument).

We may well find that some of these various religious beliefs have some things in common. For example, you will find that the Judaist/Christian God is somewhat similar to the God of the Koran. Can this be explained by the simple fact that both are traced to the same region? Is it any surprise that they are so similar to each other? After all, they represent the values and beliefs of cultures that are very close in geographic proximity. By contrast, American Indian beliefs (or those of ancient Europeans) are markedly different. Is this not an indication of some anthropological and societal/cultural source of belief (as opposed to divine)?

In conclusion, since there are so many accounts of who God is and what His nature and attributes are and how He created the world and whether or not He created the world in the first place, there is no rational justification for choosing any account over any other. And since the majority of them must be false (even if one does happen to be true) and we can’t determine which ones are or are not false, the only rational course is to reject them all (at least the ones that in any way contradict scientific observation and the logical conclusions thereof) until and unless corroboratory evidence becomes available.

Logical arguments for God

There are many versions of these arguments and I don’t seek to address them all. I propose to deal with them in a very short-handed fashion and present that each of the broad category of argument that I address contains a fatal logical error.


Design arguments

Arguments that fall within this category are arguments that rely on the very organised nature of the world around us, of life itself and of the human body and its functions. It is claimed that things couldn’t fall into place so well unless there was an intelligent designer behind their creation.

The first question to ask is: are things really so well organised? I assert that they’re not. The universe is a very random place with huge numbers of bodies and galaxies and clusters of galaxies, all expanding as a result of what scientists call The Big Bang. Stars and galaxies collide, they die, the get attracted to the gravity of other objects and form new bodies or groups of bodies. Of course, from our human perspective, given that we have been around but for a fraction of a second in universal terms, the universe seems very organised. It would certainly look that way to the ancient inhabitants of this planet. They didn’t have the science and the technology to see the chaos that reigns in the universe when considered at the grand scale.

We have strong evidence that the Earth was one day populated by millions of dinosaurs. They roamed the planet for millions of years. And yet, in a relatively short time they became extinct. Some scientists believe this resulted from an asteroid hit. Others blame it on a volcanic eruption. Yet others claim that it was a combination of the two. Whatever the truth of the matter, each is a viable and natural explanation. My question is: what is so organised about a universe where an entire class of species gets wiped out by a single cosmic (or volcanic) event? One might think this event was chaotic; not to say random.

The argument from design has had its heyday. Most scientists (by far) today accept the theory of natural selection as true. The theory holds water because it explains the evolution of life as a natural process. Living things adapt to their environment by way of random mutations. We see these mutations every day. We see kids born with 6 fingers or animals born with two tails. We see insects with unusual (for their species) colours. It’s completely logical to say that a creature that is better adapted to survive is more likely to leave offspring. It’s equally logical to say that the offspring is likely to inherit the parent’s traits. We all know this. Heredity has been known to humans since ancient times. Today, scientists explain it in terms of genetics and DNA. So, if animals that are better adapted to survive are more likely to leave behind offspring, they are more likely to pass on those better-adapted traits. Over time, this results in a changing population. Sometimes, the original population dies out and only those with the new traits remain. At other times, both populations survive and simply branch off in different directions. But we know that creatures change. We have the fossil record. Scientists use that fossil record to look at how creatures have evolved over time. It all makes perfect sense. Sure, there are many details that still need explanation. There always will be. Humans strive for knowledge and the more we know the more we learn about how much more there is to learn. But the point here is that evolution in terms of natural selection makes perfect sense.

I have outlined some very common scientific views just to show that there are perfectly natural explanations for the way the world is “organised”. I am not trying to prove that they are true. I don’t need to prove that. Why? Because we are looking for a positive reason for a default atheist to change the status quo and become a theist. So, in order to make a rational and informed choice to take this step based on arguments from design, the person would have to be aware of the scientific explanations and reject them in favour of the competing theory. But let’s look at what that entails.

1. The argument from design starts from the premiss that things are too complicated to have arisen without an intelligent designer.

2. But in order to overcome the hurdle in (1), the argument posits the pre-existence of a being even more complex and organised than the universe itself is; a being so complex and so organised that it was capable of creating the universe and all the complex things within it while being self-aware and possessing a mind large enough to contain the knowledge of the entire universe plus of the being itself.

The contradiction is a glaring one.

Some apologists will contend that the being in question is God and that only God is capable of being so organised and so complex and of always having existed. In my submission that is circular reasoning. It assumes that God does have certain properties in the first place and that nothing else could have some of those properties. The apologist is further likely to resort to God’s unknowable nature. We can’t comprehend God and therefore we can’t be critical of the propositions put by arguments from design. But the fact of the matter is that we don’t fully understand the beginning of the universe either. If we did, there would be no argument from design in the first place. Once we get our heads around this proposition, the argument from design becomes a species of an argument from ignorance.

Since we don’t understand the beginning of the universe, we can’t claim that the universe was governed by the same laws then as it is now. In fact, many scientists believe that it wasn’t. The nature of the universe during the Planck Epoch was markedly different to what it is now. For example, it is suggested that all forces were unified at that stage. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_epoch

To conclude this section, arguments from design contradict much of the scientific knowledge that we have today. In addition, they rely on circular logic by positing the pre-existence of something even more complex in order to explain the existence of something less complex which, they claim, couldn’t exist except for the existence and interference of the more complex being.

Therefore, for an atheist to rely on arguments from design in the big step of becoming a theist, he would have to reject the majority of the body of science and to accept a circular argument. I submit that this is not a rational course to take.

Ontological arguments

The typical ontological argument relies on the description of God as a perfect being. Since God is perfect as a concept, God must exist in reality because if He didn’t, He’d be less perfect than one who does and therefore wouldn’t be perfect (because existence is a necessary part of perfection).

It has been said that this argument is abhorred by most but loved by some (see the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy for one).

Regardless of how many people love or hate the argument, it doesn’t flow logically. It simply doesn’t justify the leap between God as a concept and God as a reality.

Quite simply, if God doesn’t exist in reality then God as a perfect concept is just that; a perfect concept. Even if this does make God less perfect than He would be if He did in fact exist, then so be it; this has no bearing on the question. You can’t bring a non-existent thing into existence simply by defining its concept in such a way that would “necessitate” its existence. It’s impossible. Things either exist in reality or they don’t. Their existence doesn’t depend on how we imagine them.

One could be excused in thinking that the ontological argument is just a light-hearted exercise to prove something that is unprovable.

Since the argument is illogical in that it seeks to bring about the existence of something merely based on its definitional attributes, it is not a rational reason for an atheist to become a theist.

Cosmological argument

This argument seeks to prove God’s existence on the basis that everything that is physical has to have a cause. That being the case, the universe has to have a cause. That cause must be God.

There are several problems with this argument.

Firstly, the very assumption that everything has to have a cause relies on our empirical experience of things around us. We are very much accustomed to things not happening without a cause and it seems unnatural for us to accept that they could. But God is unnatural (He’s supernatural). Therefore, by accepting that God might exist, we accept that things can exist such that they don’t have to have a cause. Why then do we claim that the universe needs one? Is the universe as a whole in any way subject to any principles that we derive from empirical experience? Some might argue that it’s not. Empirical experience is relevant to things that are not unique. There is only one universe that we know of and we haven’t had an opportunity to obtain any empirical experience at all about how universes (as a whole) behave. We simply don’t know if they need causes in order to exist. The assumption that the universe has to have a cause is not based on any verifiable data or observation.

The apologist might now claim that everything that is physical has a cause and the universe is physical and therefore it also must have a cause. Again, my response is the same, but with a slight addition. We can’t say that everything that’s physical has a cause because we haven’t been able to test everything that’s physical (or every class of physical things) for its requirement to have a cause. One thing we haven’t been able to test for it is a universe. There’s only one of those that we know of and there’s nothing to suggest that the universe must have a cause.

The second problem is that there is an assumption in the cosmological argument that the universe can’t always have existed. The term “always” only makes sense when time is part of the equation. But time is a factor of matter and space. Let’s think about this for a second. Just what is time? How do we know of time and how do we measure it? Our units of time are based on the time it takes Earth to make one full revolution around its own axis. We call that one day. Then we arbitrarily divide that by 24 and we get one hour. We arbitrarily divide that by 60 and get one minute. And then we measure time by using clocks of all sorts. They depend on the properties of matter. The matter around us acts subject to some laws of physics and they seem to be fairly uniform. So, a crystal might vibrate at regular intervals and we can use that to measure time. Or a spring or pendulum will move at regular intervals and we can also adopt that to give us some idea of what time it “is”. But without all that matter around us, without the sun and the quartz and any matter at all, would there be time? If there was no universe at all, no matter, no energy, would time exist? Since time is a function of space, there is good reason to believe that there was no time before there was space. Hence, there was never a time when there was no universe. The universe has always existed. There are competing theories on this. Some scientists believe that time existed before the universe; that there was another “timeframe”. Of course, this is just speculation. It’s very probable (and many believe this to be a fact) that we will never be able to know about the universe prior to the Planck Epoch. Time may have existed or it may have not. There may have been another form of a universe or there may have not. Some believe that the universe has been expanding and contracting and then expanding again (a potentially backwardly-infinite series of Big Bangs and Big Crunches).

What does all that mean? It means that we don’t know if there ever was a time before the universe and, even if there was, we don’t know what was there before the universe. We don’t know what laws of nature existed and what caused the universe to change. Does the fact that we don’t know in any way lend itself to the existence of an omnipotent and sentient being? It does not. It could lend itself to any number of things that we simply don’t understand. It’s ok to speculate about them and to say that X Y or Z are possibilities. It’s ok to say that God was a possibility. But it wouldn’t be rational to take just one of those possibilities and claim it to be an absolute truth. To put a sentient and omnipotent God behind our lack of knowledge of the early universe and to leave it at that is nothing short of appealing to ignorance.

In conclusion, using a cosmological argument to change from an atheist to a theist is not rational. It involves a huge leap from not knowing how the universe originated to assuming that there was a sentient and omnipotent being who made it happen. It also relies on an assumption that the universe had to be caused; an assumption that has no support for it given that we can’t know about the properties of the universe in its earliest moments. It also assumes that time was as it is now, which in itself is a huge leap. Reducing all this to a sentient and omnipotent God is a gigantic appeal to ignorance.

Personal Experience and Revelations

We hear quite a lot about theists who claim that they have had personal experience with their chosen God and that God has revealed Himself in some way or another to them. How rational are those claims?

Certainly, if God comes down from the sky and performs a couple of miracles and you are able to verify that they did take place (to exclude yourself hallucinating) and then tells you “I am God, you must believe”, there is little I could argue against in terms of rationality of the claim.

But these are not the type of revelations we hear of. In fact, it’s rare (if it ever happens at all) that we hear of someone who was an atheist and God revealed Himself to them and they then started to believe. Rather, what we hear is believers telling us their testimony about how God works wonders in their lives. Obviously, this scenario isn’t a reason to become a theist. The persons in this scenario are theists already. A theist doesn’t need a reason to become a theist; he can't become a theist for he already is one.

But even those accounts, the accounts given to us by people who are already theists, are dubious insofar as their ability to amount to any reason to believe in God is concerned. Firstly, these revelations are common throughout all the various religions of the world. They have been known in reference to polytheistic beliefs as well as monotheistic beliefs. They have happened to Hinduists and to Judaists and to Christians and to American Indians. Would that mean that it’s rational to accept that all those Gods are true? They vary in their attributes, descriptions and abilities and in their wishes as to what they want us, humans, to do if we are to reach whatever heavenly reward they have in store.

But secondly, how miraculous are these revelations in the first place? If they consist of “I prayed and God fulfilled my prayer” then one might say that they aren’t all that supernatural after all. How many times did you pray and God didn’t fulfil your prayer? Probably many. On those occasions, you might say “obviously it wasn’t God’s will that what I prayed for should happen”. But doesn’t that just equate to saying that what God wants will happen in the first place? And if so, the significance of prayer vanishes. We just end up with “something unusual happened”. This might mean that someone who was terminally ill came back to health. They had a 1% chance of recovery and they recovered. Well, that means that they were that “1 in 100” who do recover. They didn’t even beat the odds. They just fit within the odds.

I have never heard of a theist claim of “personal revelation” that was anything more than a completely natural, even if in itself unlikely, event. That doesn’t mean that none exist. 

Insofar as any personal revelations that are not in themselves supernatural (such as God coming down from Heaven or a laptop levitating and saying “repent”), they are not a rational reason to become a theist. They simply reflect things that are perfectly natural, even if rare. Rare things happen. They just happen rarely.





Considerations of “Purpose”

There are those among us who base their belief in God simply on the statement “there must be more to existence than just this”, “evil can’t prevail and it clearly often does on Earth”, “I just can’t believe that we just die and we exist no more” and other such propositions.

To summarise all these in two short words: “wishful thinking”.

Of course it would be nice if we could all live forever. It’s only natural to want to. Not many really want to die and exist no more. To go further, we find it unimaginable that we could actually die and exist no more. This is perfectly natural. We simply can’t imagine not existing. That’s because everything we know of, all our experience and knowledge and perception comes from our own existence. But whether or not we can imagine not existing has absolutely no bearing on the truth of the matter, whatever that truth might be. We can wish all we like for an everlasting life. But either there is such a thing or there isn’t. Wanting something really bad (if we don’t have the power to make it true) just isn’t enough for it to become true.

Does there have to be a world where evil never prevails? No. There doesn’t. It would be nice if there were. We could all get rewarded for acting morally here on Earth. It would be perfect. It would give us a divine incentive to adhere to some principles. But unfortunately that’s not enough to make it true. The question of what “evil” is in the first place is a long and wide one. If we look at the universe as a whole and at ourselves as just parts of the universe, there really is no such thing as “evil”. We do things that we do because we can’t do anything other to what we do. This, of course represents a “deterministic” view of the reality. Anything that we do to ourselves or to others is just the universe doing things to itself. There’s no evil in this. Evil is a concept that humans have invented as a factor of their social interactions. The concept is related to morality. And we all know that morality isn’t a universal thing; let alone divine. There are different concepts of what is moral and what is not in different cultures. Some cultures mandate the circumcision of young girls. Others allow (or have allowed) the killing and eating of another human being. There have been cultures where it was acceptable to kill a deformed baby. Is the Western culture morally superior? We’d like to think so. But is it? Then why do we punish a man who steals to feed an addiction? He is addicted, he gets a craving, he can’t control himself. Does he not need treatment instead of punishment? Why do we punish those who steal to feed a starving child? Do we value property more than we do life? Surely, that can’t be the case.

Morality is a factor of society. It’s an outcome of culture. What is or isn’t evil is a question that’s subject to that morality and it varies from one culture to another. We can wish for a world without “evil” but, as soon as we ask ourselves what “evil” is, we tend to run into problems.

Of course, one could turn around and say that it makes good sense to become a theist if that puts our mind at ease; if we end up believing in something good and we act accordingly. But is that rational? It can’t be. If God doesn’t exist, then believing in Him just to feel better isn’t anymore rational than a cancer patient forcing himself to believe that he’s healthy. And if God does exist, then this “wishful thinking” approach can’t be a rational reason to believe in Him. There is no causal connection between wishing for God’s existence and God’s existence being true. So, if someone believes on these grounds and happens to be right, it’s just a lucky coincidence. But lucky coincidences in this context are pure guesses. They are not rational choices.

Pascal’s Wager

Pascal’s Wager can be summarised by the following:

“I may be right or I may be wrong. If I believe in God and I am wrong then I have nothing to lose. If I don’t believe in God and I am wrong then I stand to lose everything”.

Surprisingly enough, I happen to know theists who have turned to God for no other reasons than that. But this can’t be a rational approach. Firstly, if God exists, is He likely to accept this as genuine belief? I can’t speak for God’s sense of fairness but I certainly wouldn’t. Rather, it’s a wiseguy approach aimed at attempting to secure a reward without truly deserving it. Can a Pascal’s Wager believer be considered a believer in the true sense? That question remains open.

But on another level, is there a reason at all to even engage in Pascal’s Wager unless some rational reason exists to become a theist in the first place? If there is no rational reason to take the big step of becoming a theist, why would one even worry about risking an eternity in “hell”? (I use that term loosely as obviously there are different versions of it in various religions and some don’t have it at all). I suggest that there isn’t. If there are no other rational reasons for believing in the first place, undertaking Pascal’s Wager would be like avoiding crossing an old a train track that has long been disconnected from any functioning train services. There is no rational reason to suppose that a train can ever run on that track.


Culture, tradition, upbringing

Why do we have whole countries that are predominantly theist (eg Poland)? Why do we have whole countries that are predominantly atheist (eg Sweden)? Poland and Sweden are no further from each other than LA is from Chicago. And yet such a difference. Is this because God’s message hasn’t reached Sweden? Doubtful. Is this because the Polish are smarter than the Swedish? Doubtful. Less smart? Doubtful (Polack jokes do not reflect on the entire nation; there's a history of how they have become popular). Then why such differences? Isn’t it down to culture? Parents, kinder, school, society. We learn from those around us. It would seem that so many people have made that step of becoming theists based simply on the social conditions around them. But is this rational?

In the sense of “fitting in” it might be. You’re more likely to make friends if you’re just like everyone else is. You might even be more likely to get a job (hidden prejudices do exist). But what would we think of a believer who says he only believes because he wants to be liked or to get a job? We’d think he’s pragmatic. Would we think he’s a real believer? Possibly not. Would those who truly believe accept him as a real believer? Possibly not. Then is he in fact a real believer?

Does it make any sense to believe in God just because your mother does? Probably not. If you’re going to hold out that God in fact exists and that you know His characteristics and that you know how to please Him, you should rely on some evidence of His existence (“evidence” used in the broad sense here) rather than simply on the fact that it happens to be the “in thing” in your family.

At the end of the day, believing in God simply because those around you do, is akin to appealing to popularity. It’s not a rational choice. If your mother taught you (and I know some mothers who did) that men are inherently smarter than women or that it’s perfectly ok to take drugs, would it be rational for you to accept those claims as facts? I submit that it wouldn’t.

It’s not rational to believe simply because those around you believe.



Conclusion

We are atheists by default. We need a reason to become theists. In the foregoing paragraphs, I have demonstrated that a number of common reasons why people may become theists are not rational reasons.

I conclude that, at least insofar as the above reasons are concerned, it is irrational for a person to become a theist.